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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
FOREWORD: "SEPARATE BUT EQUAL" IN




How could the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals-reputed to be the
nation's most liberal federal appellate court'-reject a constitutional
challenge to "separate but equal" housing of blacks and whites2 in prison
reception centers? "Common-sense," replied the circuit court in Johnson v.
California. It did not matter that the ruling invited comparison to Plessy v.
Ferguson,4 which upheld the Jim Crow laws of the post-Reconstruction
South.'
* Professor of Corrections and Correctional Law, Minnesota State University; Editor-in-
Chief, The Criminal Law Bulletin. Dipl. in Law, Oxford University, 1988; M.A. (criminal
justice), California State University at Sacramento, 1979; J.D., Washington University in St.
Louis, 1975; B.A., University of Washington (Phi Beta Kappa), 1972. This Article is
dedicated to Professor Robert Redhead, my colleague and dear friend, upon his retirement.
The views expressed herein are solely those of the author.
1 Jerome Farris, Judges on Judging: The Ninth Circuit-Most Maligned Circuit in the
Country-Fact or Fiction?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1465, 1471 (1997) ("Some observers contend
that the Ninth Circuit is reversed so often because it is the most liberal circuit in the country
and because the Supreme Court is currently conservative."). But see Erwin Chemerinsky,
The Myth of the Liberal Ninth Circuit, 37 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (2003) ("On the other
hand, people often forget that, for every liberal on the Ninth Circuit, there is a judge who
occupies the exact opposite place on the ideological continuum.").
2 Unless otherwise indicated, references to "whites" designate non-Hispanic Caucasians.
3 321 F.3d 791, 798 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
4 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
5 Jim Crow was a metaphor for the complex array of laws and customs dictating
separation of the races in public life in the post-Reconstruction South. See generally RAY
STANNARD BAKER, FOLLOWING THE COLOR LINE (Comer House Publishers 1973) (1908)
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When considering Johnson v. California, the Ninth Circuit had before
it the most "illiberal" practice: the California Department of Corrections
("CDC") employed race as the determinative classification criterion in
assigning inmates to the double-occupancy cells of its reception centers.
6
New male inmates as well as males transferred within the CDC prison
system resided there for some sixty days.7 Segregation by race invariably
resulted;8 to do otherwise would invite interracial violence, particularly
among inmates affiliated with rival gangs-or so the defendants asserted.9
(examining de jure racial segregation in the South and de facto segregation in the North at
the beginning of the twentieth century); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY DENTON, AMERICAN
APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 25 (1993) (describing the
"Jim Crow system"). The origin of this term "is lost in obscurity." C. VANN WOODWARD,
THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 7 (2d rev. ed. 1966). C. Vann Woodward described the
pervasiveness of Jim Crow:
[U]p and down the avenues and byways of Southern life appeared with increasing profusion the
little signs: "Whites Only" or "Colored." Sometimes the law prescribed their dimension in
inches, and in one case the kind and color of paint. Many appeared without the requirement by
law-over entrances and exits, at theaters and boarding houses, toilets and water fountains,
waiting room and ticket rooms.
Id. at 98.
With the intent of challenging state-imposed segregation of African-American railroad
passengers, Homer Plessy suffered arrest for his attempt to sit with whites. See RICHARD
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 73 (1977). The railway company had a "professed distaste for the
segregation law" and "almost certainly" had prearranged the arrest of Homer Plessy. Id.
Homer Plessy claimed violations of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, with the
latter being "[tihe nub of the case." Id. at 73-74. Using a "reasonableness" standard, the
Supreme Court held that the Louisiana law did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550-51. In finding the statutorily-mandated separation of the races not
inconsistent with the equal protection of the law, the Court, in one telling passage, posited:
Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation, in places where they are liable to be
brought into contact, do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have
been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency of the state legislatures in
the exercise of their police power. The most common instance of this is connected with the
establishment of separate schools for white and colored children, which have been held to be a
valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of States where the political rights of the
colored race have been longest and most earnestly enforced.
Id. at 544.
6 Johnson, 321 F.3d at 794 ("Although race is only one of many factors, it is a dominant
factor ....").
7 See id.
8 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 10, Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) (No.
03-636) (stating that "[t]he record is clear that there's a near 0 percent chance that any black
person could be housed with any white person").
9 See Johnson, 321 F.3d at 794 (observing that "race is very important to inmates and it
plays a significant role in antisocial behavior"); id. at 801 ("The CDC simply does not have
to wait until inmates and guards are murdered specifically because race is not considered...
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Though corrections officials proffered no empirical evidence of racial
violence in the reception centers to substantiate their fears,'0 the court of
appeals ruled in their favor." In Johnson, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
"common-sense" dictated that the races be separated to abate possible
violence.1
2
Common sense may have its virtues, but not when adjudicating equal
protection claims. The Ninth Circuit's reliance on common sense in its
means-ends scrutiny resulted in a decision influenced by "everyday
maxims, beliefs and ideas about race"' 3-the normative basis for common
sense racism.
The Supreme Court in its 2004 Term overturned the Ninth Circuit's
ruling in Johnson v. California.14 Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in
Johnson brings to mind F. Scott Fitzgerald's reprise in The Great Gatsby:
"So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the
past.' 5 On the one hand, the Court departed from its longstanding policy
of deferring to "the reasonable judgments of [prison] officials."' 6 On the
instead, Turner allows the administrators to stave off potentially dangerous policies without
first 'seeing what happens."').
10 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 8, 7-8 ("The State of California has been
unable to identify a single incident of a-of interracial violence between cellmates."). The
circuit court did state that "in the administrators' experience," various ethnic groups "tend to
be at odds with one another." Johnson, 321 F.3d at 794. In addition, the court wrote that an
associate warden "testified that if race were not considered... she is certain that there would
be racially based conflict in the cells and in the yard." Id.
"1 See Johnson, 321 F.3d at 807.
12 Compare id. at 802 ("Given the admittedly high racial tensions and violence already
existing within the CDC, there is clearly a common-sense connection between the use of
race as the predominant factor in assigning cell mates for 60 days until it is clear how the
inmate will adjust to his new environment .... ), with Stewart v. Rhodes, 473 F. Supp.
1185, 1188 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (asserting that "an equally 'common sense' attitude... would
indicate that the segregation of inmates rather than their integration tends to create racial
misunderstandings and tensions").
13 John D. Brewer, Competing Understandings of Common Sense Understanding: A
Brief Comment on "Common Sense Racism, " 35 BRIT. J. Soc. 66, 68 (1984); see also infra
notes 118-33 and accompanying text (elaborating on the concept of common sense racism).
14 Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 515 (2005).
15 F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY 189 (Simon & Schuster 1995) (1925).
16 Johnson, 543 U.S. at 524 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also infra note 201 (citing cases
mandating deference). For the greater half of the twentieth century, courts embraced a
"hands-off' approach to prisoners' civil rights claims. See, e.g., Douglas v. Sigler, 386 F.2d
684, 688 (8th Cir. 1967) ("[C]ourts will not interfere with the conduct, management, and
disciplinary control of this type of institution except in extreme circumstances."); United
States ex rel. Atterbury v. Ragen, 237 F.2d 953, 955 (8th Cir. 1956) ("We think that it is well
settled that it is not the function of the courts to superintend the treatment and discipline of
prisoners .... ) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Garcia v. Steele, 193 F.2d
2006]
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other hand, the Court crafted a "tamed" version of Brown v. Board of
276, 278 (8th Cir. 1951) ("[Clourts have no supervisory jurisdiction over the conduct of the
various institutions."); Taylor v. United States, 179 F.2d 640, 643 (9th Cir. 1950) ("It is not
within the province of the courts to supervise the treatment of prisoners in the penitentiary,
but only to deliver from prison those who are illegally detained there."); United States ex rel.
Palmer v. Ragen 159 F.2d 356, 358 (7th Cir. 1947) ("Under repeated decisions, state
governmental bodies, who are charged with prosecution and punishment of offenders, are
not to be interfered with except in case of extraordinary circumstances.") (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
Commencing in the late 1960s lower federal courts broke with their "hands-off' doctrine
and expanded the rights of inmates. See, e.g., Knell v. Bessinger, 489 F.2d 1014, 1018 (7th
Cir. 1973) (identifying a right to due process in classification decisions); Woodhouse v.
Virginia, 487 F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973) (identifying a right to be free of inmate
violence); Thomas v. Brierley, 481 F.2d 660, 661 (3d Cir. 1973) (identifying a right to be
free of racial discrimination); Fitzke v. Shappell, 468 F.2d 1072, 1076 (6th Cir. 1972)
(identifying a right to medical care); Hamilton v. Covington, 445 F. Supp. 195, 202 (W.D.
Ark. 1978) (identifying a right to be free from fire hazards); Padgett v. Stein, 406 F. Supp.
287, 299 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (identifying a right to be free from overcrowding); Sinclair v.
Henderson, 331 F. Supp. 1123, 1128-29 (E.D. La. 1971) (identifying a right to exercise).
Numerous commentators of the period chronicled these developments. See, e.g., Fred
Cohen, The Discovery of Prison Reform, 21 BUFF. L. REV. 855 (1972); Daryl R. Fair, The
Lower Federal Courts as Constitution-Makers: The Case of Prison Conditions, 7 AM. J.
CRM. L. 119 (1979); Harvard Ctr. for Criminal Justice, Judicial Intervention in Prison
Discipline, 63 J. CRM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SC1. 200 (1972); Richard G. Singer,
Prisoners' Rights Litigation: A Look at the Past Decade and a Look at the Coming Decade,
44 FED. PROBATION 3 (1980); Michael S. Fieldberg, Comment, Confronting Conditions of
Confinement: An Expanded Role for the Courts in Prison Reform, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 367 (1977).
In 1979, in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), the Supreme Court began a concerted
effort to end the expansion of prisoners' rights by espousing a policy of deference to prison
staff:
[C]ourts must heed our warning that "[penal] considerations are peculiarly within the province
and professional expertise of correctional officials and in the absence of substantial evidence in
the record to indicate that officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations,
courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such matters."
Id. at 540 n.23 (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)); see also Hedieh
Nasheri, In the Spirit of Meanness: Courts, Prisons and Prisoners, 27 CUMB. L. REv. 1173,
1188-89 (1997) ("The turning point in the Court's approach to prison litigation occurred in
1979, the beginning of the Deference Period. In Bell v. Wolfish, the Court dramatically
altered the framework for considering prisoners' constitutional claims.") (footnotes omitted).
After Wolfish, in case after case the Supreme Court disappointed prisoners' rights
advocates. See, e.g., Laura B. Meyers & Sue Titus Reid, Modern Prisons: 1960 to the
Present, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN PRISONS 239, 243 (Marilyn D. McShane & Frank
P. Williams III eds., 1996) ("In the 1980s and 1990s, the pendulum appears to have shifted
back with a more conservative Supreme Court once again emphasizing the need for
institutional security, upholding more restrictive administrative policies."). The consistent
theme in these cases was one of deference. See infra note 201 (citing cases). Hence, Justice
Thomas's dissenting opinion is quite correct in asserting that "[t]he Constitution has always
demanded less within the prison walls." Johnson, 543 U.S. at 524 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Education17 that cannot undo the de facto racial segregation pervading the
prison community, including its inmate subculture. Like the ruling of the
Ninth Circuit, the Johnson Court will be haunted by the ghost of Homer
Plessy.
Part I of this Article addresses "location, location, location." This
mantra for defining prime real estate also applies to racially identified
space-that is, space that comes to symbolize the stereotypical features of a
racial group. Currently, the prison is the nation's most racialized type of
real estate. This is the context in which we-and in this instance I am
especially referring to white people like me-must understand why the
Ninth Circuit's ruling in Johnson reminds one of Plessy v. Ferguson. The
prison confining petitioner-inmate Garrison Johnson, much like the
segregated railroad that would have transported Homer Plessy, is a large-
scale institution that brings the races into physical proximity of one another,
while impeding their social interaction through the race-based division of
confined space.
Part II examines the contemporary origins of common sense as a
juridical tool, its propensity to embrace common sense racism, and the
likeness of common sense racism in the cultural portrait of incarcerated
black men drawn by the Ninth Circuit in Johnson. I believe that a majority
of the Ninth Circuit judges failed to recognize that "[c]ommon sense ... is
what the mind filled with presuppositions concludes, ' 18 and thus for white
judges comes replete with race inequality norms. Common sense
adjudication thereby invites application of common sense racism. Because
white people often lack a conscious racial identity, common sense racism is
largely invisible to white judges.
In Part III, the Article returns to the adjudication of the CDC's
"separate but equal" housing scheme before the Supreme Court. The
Johnson Court swept aside the Ninth's Circuit's "factless" jurisprudence in
favor of strict scrutiny of the CDC's "express racial classification."' 9 While
17 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Professor Strauss, for reasons that will
be later provided, referred to the "taming" of Brown some three decades after its
pronouncement. David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U.
CHI. L. REV. 935, 938 (1989).
18 CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LoCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETATIVE
ANTHROPOLOGY 84 (1983).
19 Johnson, 543 U.S. at 524 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In City of Cleburne. v. Cleburne
Living Center, Inc., 373 U.S. 432 (1985), the Supreme Court succinctly explained when and
how strict scrutiny operates:
[R]ace, alienage, or national origin] are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate
state interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and
antipathy-a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others. For
2006)
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the Court's ruling in Johnson reinvigorates judicial scrutiny of express race-
based prison policies, it will not end the widespread de facto racial
segregation in American prisons. As long as inmates can exercise
"freedom-of-choice" in selecting cellmates, there will likely be a "separate
but equal" outcome. Moreover, the Johnson decision will not purge
common sense racism from the adjudication of penal policies that side-step
express racial classifications or are themselves the product of "background
ideas of race," 20 which rarely evince discriminatory intent.
Part IV argues that empathy for the likes of Homer Plessy and
Garrison Johnson is a value implicit in the equal protection model advanced
by the Carolene Products' famous footnote four?' and should be
incorporated into the Court's multi-tiered equal protection test. Because
empathy teaches equal concern and respect, courts must presume purposeful
these reasons and because such discrimination is unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative
means, these laws are subjected to strict scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably
tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Similar oversight by the courts is due when state
laws impinge on personal rights protected by the Constitution.
Id. at 440 (citations omitted).
The government usually fails to meet its burden, prompting one commentator to write
that strict scrutiny is "' strict' in theory and fatal in fact." Gerald Gunther, The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972); see also, e.g., In re
Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721 (1973) (barring aliens from practicing law violated the Equal
Protection Clause); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (restricting welfare
benefits on the basis of alienage violated the Equal Protection Clause); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (criminalizing the cohabitation of interracial unmarried
couples violated the Equal Protection Clause); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)
(ruling that segregated schools violated the Equal Protection Clause). But see Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) ("[W]e wish to dispel the notion that
strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact."' (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring))).
An intermediate level of scrutiny arises for quasi-suspect criteria. See, e.g., United States
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (requiring "heightened scrutiny," in which the
government must provide an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for sex discrimination);
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("To withstand constitutional challenge, previous
cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives.").
All other classifications simply require a rational basis and enjoy a strong presumption of
constitutionality. See, e.g., City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 ("[L]egislation is presumed to
be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to
a legitimate state interest."); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976)
(observing that rationality review "presume[s] the constitutionality of the statutory
discrimination").
20 See infra notes 129-33 and accompanying text (attributing and examining the
"background ideas of race" concept).
21 United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
[Vol. 96
"SEPARATE BUT EQUAL"
discrimination against empathy-deprived groups when they are subject to a
cellmate-selection procedure that does not ensure racial integration.
Finally, Part V inquiries what a youthful, imprisoned namesake of Homer
Plessy would tell us about "doing time" in the new "peculiar institution,"
the prison of the twenty-first century. This is an institution immersed in
common sense racism.
I. FOLLOWING THE COLOR LINE: THE RAILROAD CAR THAT BECAME A
PRISON
A. "SEPARATE BUT EQUAL" IN THE CDC
It is not outside the realm of common sense to speculate that inmate
Garrison Johnson's great-great-grandfather left the Reconstruction South
for the North. If so, he might have traveled by railroad car on June 7, 1892,
the day that Homer Plessy had run afoul of Louisiana's Jim Crow
legislation.22 Homer Plessy's challenge to racially segregated passenger
coaches23 finds an unlikely parallel in Garrison Johnson's contesting a
prison policy that ensured "separate but equal" multiple-occupancy cells.24
Prisons, like railroads of Homer Plessy's America, have historically
been afflicted by racism and the separation of the races. The "separate but
equal" doctrine applied with full force to the housing of inmates in the pre-
Brown South. 25 Moreover, Northern prisons typically segregated inmates.
26
Not until 1968 did the Supreme Court in Lee v. Washington27 find the.
practice unconstitutional. In Lee, Alabama law mandated racial segregation
22 See supra note 5 (recounting the events leading to the Plessy decision).
23 See generally CHARLES S. MANGUM, JR., THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO 181-222
(1940) (discussing statutory provisions segregating African Americans on railroads prior to
World War II).
24 See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text (discussing the CDC's assignment of
inmates to double-occupancy cells in its reception centers).
25 See, e.g., JAMES B. JACOBS, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON PRISONS AND IMPRISONMENT 63-64
(1983) (writing that laws in the South "often required. .. racially homogeneous facilities");
MANGUM, supra note 23, at 223 (describing segregation in charitable and penal institutions
as "an established fact" in the South and border states).
26 See, e.g., Leo Carroll, Racial Conflict, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN PRISONS, supra
note 16, at 377 (recounting that "[o]utside the South, the policy in most prisons has been,
until recently, to segregate inmates by race within the same prison"); JACOBS, supra note 25,
at 64 (observing that racial segregation "also characterized northern prisons").
27 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam).
20061
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in prison cellblocks.28 The Court's per curiam decision did no more than
affirm the district court's order for "complete and total desegregation., 29
Justice Black's concurring opinion, on the other hand, would frame the
contemporary debate over the deference due prison staff. Arguably
premised on the belief that integration would bring discord and violence
rather than mutual respect and empathy, he called for an exception to
"complete" and permanent desegregation: "that prison authorities have the
right, acting in good faith and in particularized circumstances, to take into
account racial tensions in maintaining security, discipline, and good order
in prisons and jails., 30 In its subsequent ruling in Cruz v. Beto,31 the Court
embraced Justice Black's assertion that "the necessities of prison security
and discipline" permitted temporary racial segregation.32 What constitutes
"particularized circumstances" has been a question repeatedly before lower
federal courts.33
28 Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), affd, 390 U.S. 333 (1968)
(per curiam).
29 Lee, 390 U.S. at 333.
30 Id. at 334 (Black, J., concurring). A majority of the Justices embraced this exception
in Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972).
31 Cruz, 405 U.S. at 319.
32 Id. at 321 (quoting Lee, 333 U.S. at 334 (Black, J., concurring)).
33 See, e.g., Sockwell v. Phelps, 20 F.3d 187, 191 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Although this Court
has not specifically defined the 'particularized circumstances' exception in Lee v.
Washington, the general rule is clear: a generalized or vague fear of racial violence is not a
sufficient justification for a broad policy of racial segregation.") (footnote omitted); United
States v. Wyandotte County, Kan., 480 F.2d 969, 971 (10th Cir. 1973) ("We cannot construe
this caveat as authorizing the consistent and settled practice of 'Negroes to the East tank,
whites West tank,' we have before us. The use of the words 'particularized circumstances'
is significant...."); Mason v. Schriro, 45 F. Supp. 2d 709, 714 (W.D. Mo. 1999) ("The
court finds that defendants have not provided any specific evidence of the security dangers
that are implicated if inmates of different races are housed together .. "); Simpson v. Horn,
25 F. Supp. 2d 563, 574 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (rejecting defendants motion for a summary
judgment partly because "[d]efendants offer no evidence of particularized circumstances
justifying a general policy of cell assignments by race"); Finney v. Mabry, 534 F. Supp.
1026, 1043 (E.D. Ark. 1982) (rejecting a classification system that permitted inmates to
refuse integrated housing by merely "say[ing] the right thing"); McClelland v. Sigler, 327 F.
Supp. 829, 834 (D. Neb. 1971) (declaring that if inmates threaten violence in the face of
desegregation they should be disciplined and thus "feel the weight of the consequences of
their overt bigotry"); Rentfrow v. Carter, 296 F. Supp. 301, 303 (N.D. Ga. 1968) (calling for
disciplinary measures to maintain order rather than honoring inmates' preference for
segregated housing). The above rulings fell in line with Watson v. Memphis, 373 U.S. 526
(1963), in which the Supreme Court held that the "personal speculations or vague
disquietudes" about racial violence would not justify the segregation of public parks. Id. at
536; see also Cooper v. Aron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (holding that vague fears of racial violence
does not justify delaying desegregation of public schools). But see Walker v. Gomez, 370
F.3d 969, 980-81 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying Turner's rational basis test in finding that "[ilt
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Nonetheless, contemporary inmates live in racially divided institutions.
In many prisons, informal race-based rules govern the relations among
inmates much like the Jim Crow laws. 34 "Racism," wrote a particularly
astute prisoner, "still determines where you go, how you go, who you go
with, what you do when you arrive, who you arrive with, and what you say
when finally there." 35 The commonplace aspects of confinement include
racially segregated housing,36 with racial homogeneity in cell assignments
the statistical norm.3 7 Racial balkanization extends into the prison yard,
cafeteria, and other public places.38 Prison administrators often acquiesce
to this apartheid-like arrangement,39 sometimes with the expectation of
exploiting racial divisions.4 °
was not irrational (though it may have been unnecessary) to keep all African-Americans, as
well as all other inmates who had non-critical jobs, locked-down until everything-including
gang membership or association-got sorted out"); Harris v. Greer, 750 F.2d 617, 619 (7th
Cir. 1984) ("Racial separation brought about by policies founded exclusively on a bona fide,
colorblind concern for the safety of prisoners in our nation's dangerous prisons does not
violate the equal protection clause."); White v. Morris, 832 F. Supp. 1129, 1133 (S.D. Ohio
1993) (applying Turner's reasonableness test in concluding that "[f]orcing the random
ceiling policy at this time would pose security problems and would ignore pragmatic
penological concerns").
34 See VICTOR HASSINE ET AL., EDS., LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: LIVING IN PRISON TODAY 69
(3d ed. 2004) ("In many prisons, unwritten race-based rules of behavior are common, and
minor infractions of these rules can have serious consequences.").
35 K.C. CARCERAL, BEHIND A CONVICT'S EYES: DOING TIME IN A MODERN PRISON 137
(Thomas J. Bernard et al., eds., 2004); see also HASSINE ET AL., supra note 34, at 69 ("An
inmate's race may still determine where he can stand, sit, or work, and what he can say and
to whom he may speak."); JEFFREY IAN ROSS & STEPHEN C. RICHARDS, BEHIND BARS:
SURVIVING PRISON 51 (2002) ("With few exceptions, black prisoners associate with blacks,
whites with whites, and Hispanics with Hispanics.").
36 See, e.g., HASSINE ET AL., supra note 34, at 70 (describing "[d]e facto segregation" as
"very much alive"); ROSS & RICHARDS, supra note 35, at 51 (stating that race is the "primary
dividing line"); MICHAEL WELCH, CORRECTIONS: A CRITICAL APPROACH 275 (1996)
(describing de facto racial segregation in prison); Carroll, supra note 26, at 378 (concluding
that "[r]ace relations among prisoners is characterized by extreme segregation and
avoidance").
37 See infra note 47 and accompanying text (estimating that thirty percent of multiple-
occupancy cells are integrated).
38 See, e.g., LEO CARROLL, HACKS, BLACKS, AND CONS 147-71 (1988) (describing race
relations in a Rhode Island prison); JACOBS, supra note 25, at 71, 81 (documenting the
separation of inmates by race); JOCELYN M. POLLOCK, PRISONS AND PRISON LIFE 106 (2004)
(describing de facto racial segregation wherever inmates assemble); James E. Robertson,
Psychological Injury and the Prison Litigation Reform Act: A "Not Exactly, " Equal
Protection Analysis, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 105, 129 (2000) (concluding that "[d]e facto
segregation in housing and communal activities, such as recreation, meals, and 'hanging
out,' prevails throughout the federal and state prison systems").
39 See infra notes 243-48 and accompanying text (surveying wardens and finding that
most do little to integrate their prisons); see also HASSINE ET AL., supra note 34, at 70
2006]
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Just as Jim Crow laws strengthened racial identities,4' so too has de
facto racial segregation in the contemporary prison. Prior to their
incarceration, white inmates had been oblivious to their whiteness and the
privileges it brings.42 The onset of their imprisonment often spurs a racial
awakening. One inmate observed:
During my first years of lockup, I could not escape the fact that, in other prisoners'
eyes, I was white. The black prisoners reminded me daily, almost hourly, how white I
was. The white prisoners reminded me how black the black prisoners were. The
racial lines were continually drawn and handed to the new fish.
43
In preparing new inmates for the prison environment, the CDC, like
Homer Plessy's South, embraced "racial essentialism"-the notion that race
and ethnicity matter most in assigning one's place in the social order.44 Just
as railroad workers had designated the light-skinned Homer Plessy a
"colored person," the CDC assigned Garrison Johnson a racial identity-
that of a black man-to determine where he would reside in the reception
center.45 Thereafter, he would be permitted to select a cellmate of any
(observing that the prison staff "did its part" to ensure de facto segregation and did not cell
African Americans and whites together).
40 See Ross & RICHARDS, supra note 35, at 51 (describing the use of "racial conflict as a
means to divide and conquer the inmate population").
41 See GRACE ELIZABETH HALE, MAKING WHITENESS: THE CULTURE OF SEGREGATION IN
THE SOUTH, 1890-1940 130 (1998) ("Segregation [in the post-Reconstruction South] made
racial identity visible in a rational and systemic way .... Racialized spaces could counter
the confusion of appearances created by the increased visibility of a well-dressed, well-
spoken black middle class.").
42 See infra note 119 and accompanying text (introducing the "transparency
phenomenon").
43 CARCERAL, supra note 35, at 137.
44 The term race essentialism appears to have its origins in critiques of feminism. Most
notably, Angela P. Harris asserted:
The result of essentialism is to reduce the lives of people who experience multiple forms of
oppression to addition problems: "racism + sexism = straight black women's experience," or
"racism + sexism + homophobia = black lesbian experience." Thus, in an essentialist world,
black women's experience will always be forcibly fragmented before being subjected to analysis,
as those who are "only interested in race" and those who are "only interested in gender" take
their separate slices of our lives.
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581,
588-89 (1990); see also Jim Thomas, Racial Codes in the Prison Culture, Snapshots of Black
and White, in RACE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 126, 142 (Michael J. Lynch & E. Britt Patterson
eds., 1991) ("[T]he prison experience is a racial experience for all who participate in the
prison culture.").
45 See Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 543 U.S. 499
(2005):
Generally, inmates are listed in four general ethnic categories, black, white, Asian, and other.
Within each of these categories, officials at the reception center further divide inmates, for
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race.4 6 Such a choice, on a national level, will only infrequently match a
black inmate with his white counterpart because a mere thirty percent of the
nation's multiple-occupancy prison cells-the concrete cages inmates call
"home"--are racially integrated.47
B. "COMMON SENSE" ON THE NINTH CIRCUIT
Like Homer Plessy, Garrison Johnson challenged the use of race as a
classification criterion for determining where he would temporarily reside.48
No runaway train, the Ninth Circuit looked to case law for guidance. The
court did not find it in Lee v. Washington or Brown v. Board of Education,
but rather in Turner v. Safley.49 While the facts of Turner addressed race-
neutral prison regulations forbidding inmates from marrying and severely
restricting inmate-to-inmate correspondence,5 ° the Ninth Circuit read
Turner to require application of its easily met means-end, rational basis
test51 to a prison policy creating "separate but equal" housing.
2
example Japanese and Chinese inmates are generally not housed together, nor are Laotians,
Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Filipinos. Also, Hispanics from Northern California and
Hispanics from Southern California are not housed together because, in the administrators'
experience, they tend to be at odds with one another.
46 Id. at 794-95.
47 See Chad R. Trulson & James M. Marquart, Inmate Racial Integration: Achieving
Integration in the Texas Prison System, 82 PRISON J. 498, 512 (2002).
48 But for Garrison Johnson's persistence, his case would have hit the proverbial "brick
wall" in that he originally filed his complaint pro se in 1995, only to have it and subsequent
amended complaints dismissed by the district court. Johnson, 321 F.3d at 795. Not until the
year 2000 did the Ninth Circuit remand the case for trial upon holding that he had stated a
claim for which relief was available. See id. (recounting his long and winding judicial trek
to the Ninth Circuit). Unlike Homer Plessy, little is known of Garrison Johnson except that
he was convicted in 1987 of murder, robbery, and assault. See Johnson, Garrison v.
California, et al.-Medill--On the Docket, http://docket.medill.northwestem.edu/archives/
000805.php (last visited June 9, 2006).
49 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
50 See id. at 81-82 (describing the regulations and their consequences).
51 According to the Turner Court, the constitutionality of the regulation in question rests
on four considerations:
* "First, there must be a 'valid, rational connection' between the prison regulation
and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it." Id. at 89
(citation omitted).
" "A second factor.., is whether there are alternative means of exercising the right
that remain open to prison inmates." Id. at 90.
" "A third consideration is the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional
right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison
resources generally .... When accommodation of an asserted right will have a
significant 'ripple effect' on fellow inmates or on prison staff, courts should be
particularly deferential to the informed discretion of corrections officials." Id.
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The Ninth Circuit had good reason, at least in terms of precedent, for
using the Turner test: the Supreme Court stated on two occasions that this
four-pronged standard applies to all constitutional challenges to prison
regulations.53 Moreover, lower federal courts had already applied the
Turner test to equal protection challenges to dissimilar treatment based on
race,54 gender," and religious affiliation.56
"[I]f an inmate claimant can point to an alternative that fully accommodates the
prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests, a court may
consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the reasonable
relationship standard." Id. at 91.
The first-prong is the centerpiece of the test. See, e.g., Shaw v. Murphy, 432 U.S. 223,
229-30 (2001) ("If the connection between the regulation and the asserted goal is 'arbitrary
or irrational,' then the regulation fails, irrespective of whether the other factors tilt in its
favor.") (citation omitted); Prison Legal News v. Cook, 238 F.3d 1145, 1151 (9th Cir. 2001)
(describing the first-prong as the "sine qua non"); Walker v. Sumner, 917 F.2d 382, 385 (9th
Cir. 1990) ("The first of these factors constitutes a sine qua non.").
The origins of the Turner test reside in the Court's long-standing policy of "due
deference" to the actions of prison staff. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 90 ("[C]ourts should be
particularly conscious of the measure of judicial deference owed to corrections officials...
in gauging the validity of the regulation.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
The four-prongs give the appearance of a balancing model, but, as one commentator
observed, "what is striking about the Court's application of the Turner test is the way in
which the Turner factors are crafted (or, critics might contend, contrived) to generally
foreordain a finding against a prisoner's constitutional claim." Lynn S. Branham, "Go Sin
No More ": The Constitutionality of Governmentally Funded Faith-based Prison Units, 37
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 291, 297 (2004).
52 See Johnson, 321 F.3d at 798-99 ("Turner," asserted the Ninth Circuit, "was not
merely a cosmetic change in the [Supreme] Court's language [in Lee v. Washington]. Turner
ostensibly expanded the definition of. . . 'necessary for security and discipline,' and lowered
the prison administrators' burden to justify race-based policies.") (citation omitted).
53 See, e.g., Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 229 (2001) (describing the Turner test as a
"unitary, deferential standard for reviewing prisoners' rights claims"); Washington v.
Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 224 (1991) ("We made quite clear that the standard of review we
adopted in Turner applies to all circumstances in which the needs of prison administration
implicate constitutional rights.") (emphasis added).
54 The District Court for the Southern District of Ohio in White v. Morris, 832 F. Supp.
1129 (S.D. Ohio 1993), broke new ground by being the first to apply the Turner test to a
lawsuit brought over racially segregated cells. Prison officials instituted racial segregation in
cell assignments following a riot caused in part by integrated ceiling. See id. at 1130. In
addition, the rioting led to the destruction of prisoners' files that, according to the
defendants, prevented them from making "race neutral, random ceiling." Id. at 1132. Citing
Turner and its progeny, the court examined the constitutionality of segregated ceiling under
the deferential reasonableness standard of review. See id. at 1135-37. Moreover, its
language clearly indicated that this standard applied to no less than all challenges to prison
policies addressing security concerns. See id. at 1136 ("Thus, the federal courts must judge
any prison policy addressing security concerns that impinge on prisoners' constitutional
rights under a reasonableness standard of review."). Giving "considerable deference" to the
defendant prison authorities, the court held in their favor. Id. at 1133; see also Simpson v.
[Vol. 96
"SEPARATE BUT EQUAL"
Moreover, prior to the Johnson litigation, the Ninth Circuit, Second
Circuit, and District of Columbia Circuit had used common sense in
gauging the reasonableness of various prison rules. 57  For instance, in
Kimberlin v. Department of Justice,58 the District of Columbia Circuit
upheld prison regulations banning electric and electronic musical devices.
59
Regarding the all-important first prong of the Turner test, the Kimberlin
court found the prohibition "reasonably related to the asserted goal [of]
conserving correctional funds.,,60 The court reached this conclusion without
needing any empirical evidence; "[c]ommon sense," posited the three-judge
panel, "tells us ... that a prisoner's possession and use of an electric guitar
costs correctional institutions money for electricity, upkeep, storage, and
supervision.'
61
Horn, 25 F. Supp. 2d 563, 570 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (stating in dicta that the defendant's double-
celling policy, which considered race as one of several "compatibility factors," was
permissible under the Turner test).
55 Klinger v. Dep't of Corr., 31 F.3d 727, 729 (8th Cir. 1994).
56 Shabazz v. Bamauskas, 790 F.2d 1536, 1539 (11 th Cir. 1986).
57 See, e.g., Kimberlin v. Dep't of Justice, 318 F.3d 228, 233 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (using
"[c]ommon sense" to determine that the energy used for electric instruments justifies their
ban as a rational means of advancing penal aims); Frost v. Symington, 197 F.3d 348, 357
(9th Cir. 1999) (finding a "common-sense connection" between prison security and banning
a publication depicting sexual penetration); Ametal v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192, 199 (D.C. Cir.
1998) ("We do not think.., that common sense must be a mere handmaiden of social
science data or expert testimonials .... Nor do we think that Safley requires more."); Giano
v. Senkowski, 54 F.3d 1050, 1055 (2d Cir. 1994) (using common sense to uphold a policy
that allows commercial erotic literature but bars semi-nude photos of girlfriends or wives).
Later, however, in Wolf v. Ashcroft, 297 F.3d 305, 308-09 (3d Cir. 2002), the Second Circuit
qualified its use of common sense:
While the connection may be a matter of common sense in certain instances, such that a ruling
on this issue based only on the pleadings may be appropriate, there may be situations in which
the connection is not so apparent and does require some factual development. Whether the
requisite connection may be found solely on the basis of "common sense" will depend on the
nature of the right, the nature of the interest asserted, the nature of the prohibition, and the
obviousness of its connection to the proffered interest. The showing required will vary
depending on how close the court perceives the connection to be.
Id. at 308-09. But see Giano, 54 F.3d at 1060 (Calabresi, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that
prison staffs "self-serving assertions" do not justify the majority's "common sense
determination" that nude photographs of prisoners' wives could lead to violence among
inmates).
58 Kimberlin, 318 F.3d 228.
59 See id. at 229-30 (describing the Zimmer Amendment, also known as the No Frills
Prison Act).




Against this backdrop, the Ninth Circuit in Johnson concluded that
Turner had "lowered the prison administrators' burden [from that required
by Lee and by implication Brown v. Board of Education] to justify race-
based policies." 62 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit embraced the least demanding
of the equal protection tests-the one used when hot dog vendors complain
of discriminatory treatment 63-by inquiring whether there existed a rational
basis for de jure racial segregation. The court answered as follows:
Given the admittedly high racial tensions and violence already existing within the
CDC, there is clearly a common-sense connection between the use of race as the
predominant factor in assigning cell mates for 60 days until it is clear how the inmate
will adjust to his new environment and reducing racial violence and maintaining a
safer environment.
6 4
"Common-sense" could be rebutted if the plaintiff overcame a "heavy
burden.,65 Only then would the Johnson court require the CDC to make an
evidentiary showing.66  The plaintiffs evidence fell short of this mark,
despite referencing an empirical study establishing that desegregation of
prison cells in Texas led to a drop in inmate-on-inmate violence.67
By embracing common sense, the Ninth Circuit joined the Plessy
Court in legitimating a "separate but equal" standard. But more
importantly, it emulated the Plessy Court in using racialized knowledge-
that is, "embedded social practices that reflect racial thinking.168 In Plessy,
the Court had openly attributed racial segregation to acceptable cultural
62 Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791,798-99 (9th Cir. 2003).
63 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L.
REv. 22, 61 n.428 (1992) (observing that "bipolar, two-tier equal protection review treated
discrimination against blacks as suspect, but not discrimination against opticians, hot dog
vendors, or debt adjusters").
64 Id. at 798 (emphasis added). The court brought to bear "common-sense" when
addressing the first of the four-prongs in the Turner test, which, as the Third Circuit
observed in Waterman v. Farmer, 183 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 1999), "'looms especially large'
because it 'tends to encompass the remaining factors, and some of its criteria are apparently
necessary conditions."' Id. at 213-14 (quoting Amatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir.
1998)); see also supra note 51 (citing cases describing the first prong as the "sine qua non"
of the Turner test).
65 Johnson, 321 F.3d at 798, 801 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
66 See id. at 803.
67 Chad Trulson & James W. Marquart, The Caged Melting Pot: Toward an
Understanding of the Consequences of Desegregation in Prisons, 36 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
743, 774 (2002) (concluding that "[i]ntegration did not result in disproportionate violence;
rather, over the long term, the rate of violence between inmates segregated by race in double
cells surpassed the rate among those racially integrated").




norms, a repository of common sense. 69  In Johnson, the Ninth Circuit
likely did not know that it relied upon racialized knowledge when it set
aside empiricism in favor of common sense. The circuit's failure to
recognize its use of racialized knowledge comports with the "new racism"
paradigm, in which racism expresses itself diffusely 7 and often arises from
what Ian Haney L6pez calls "background ideas of race.'
The following Part of this Article elaborates upon the central concepts
in play: common sense as a juridical tool, its interface with common sense
racism, and the role of common sense and common sense racism in the
Johnson litigation. As demonstrated below, judges applying common sense
to resolve equal protection issues in prison enter an arena suffused with
common sense racism.
II. CLOSING THE CIRCLE: COMMON SENSE AND RACISM
A. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF COMMON SENSE
Judges' use of common sense-what "everybody knows" 72-hardly
seems inappropriate. Surely all judges are sometimes forced to make their
69 In finding the de jure "separation of the two races in public conveyances" to be
reasonable, the Plessy Court invoked as its "standard" "the established usages, customs, and
traditions of the people, and.., the preservation of the public peace and good order." Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896); see also Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No
Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1111, 1129 (1997) (stating that the Plessy "decision conformed to 'common sense' intuitions
about the meaning of equality" during that historical period).
70 See John 0. Calmore, Racism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty, 52 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 1067, 1078 (1989) ("[T]his new racism reflects diffuse negative feelings
toward blacks and other nonwhites. These feelings derive from early political and racial
socialization and not from personal experience or competition with blacks.") (footnote
omitted); cf, e.g., Alan J. Tomkins et al., Subtle Discrimination in Juvenile Justice
Decisionmaking: Social, Scientific Perspectives and Explanations, 29 CREIGHTON L. REv.
1619, 1637 n.123 (1996) ("Social scientists have proposed a number of theories to describe
contemporary forms of racism, including such labels as 'symbolic racism,' 'modem racism,'
and 'aversive racism.' While these theories are distinguishable on a conceptual level, they
share the same basic assumptions about the complexity and nature of racial attitudes."). But
see Angel R. Oquendo, Re-Imagining the Latino/a Race, 12 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 93,
109 (1995) ("The rise of this modem racism does not mean that the old fashioned racism has
completely disappeared. In fact, there has recently been a resurgence of old fashioned
racism. Modem racism seems to have made old fashioned racism fashionable again.").
71 IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, RACISM ON TRIAL: ThE CHICANO FIGHT FOR JUSTICE 7 (2003)
(stating in part that common sense racism "is unconsidered and reflexive, the product of
thoughtless reliance on background ideas of race").
72 Richard K. Sherwin, Dialects and Dominance: A Study of Rhetorical Fields in the Law
of Confessions, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 729, 737 (1988).
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"best guess" about cause and effect, relying on common sense because of
lack of empirical information.73 After all, as one commentator observed,
"common-law judges have been finding the 'common sense' of the
situation for centuries by relying, in part, on their intuitions. ' 4
But would the "arch-apostle of common-law judging," 75 Oliver
Wendell Holmes, have embraced the common sense that permitted the
racial segregation of California inmate Garrison Johnson? Greatly
influenced by pragmatism, 76 which posited that truth lay in coherence of
ideas, 7 Holmes would have been troubled that common sense often
contradicts itself; to wit, "a penny saved is a penny earned," but "you have
to spend money to make money., 78 Common sense lacks coherence for a
good reason: its attributes include what Clifford Geertz described as
"immethodologicalness" because "it caters at once to the pleasures of
The first dialect may be described as the rhetoric of ordinary common sense ("OCS"). In the
prereflective attitude of common sense, the meanings I share with others in the routines of
everyday life inform my world, my sense of self, and the way I interact with others. What I
know is "self-evident"; it is "what everybody knows." We thus share a common language that
supplies the terms that construct reality.
Id.
Siegwart Lindeberg asserts that common sense rests on three assumptions: (1)
"considerable uniformity of nature ."; (2) "considerable uniformity of human nature .."
and (3) "considerable uniformity of human experience." Siegwart Lindeberg, Common
Sense and Social Structure: a Sociological View, in COMMON SENSE 199, 200 (Frits van
Holthoon & David R. Olson eds., 1987).
73 See David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the
Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 541, 545 (1991)
("Historically, most constitutional fact-finding depended on the Justices' best guess about
the matter."); see also Lindeberg, supra note 72, at 208 (observing that "[w]here common
sense is operative it cannot fail to find its way into constitution and law"); Richard E.
Redding, How Common Sense Psychology Can Inform Law and Psycholegal Research, 5 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 107, 114 (1998) ("Like everyone, lawyers and judges make
implicit assumptions about human behavior.").
74 Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78
VA. L. REV. 821, 908 (1992).
75 Nadine Strossen, Religion and Politics: A Reply to Justice Antonin Scalia, 24
FORDIAM URB. L.J. 427,441 (1997).
76 See Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787, 792
(1989) ("presenting Holmes through the lens of pragmatism").
77 Catharine Wells Hantzis, Legal Innovation Within the Wider Intellectual Tradition:
The Pragmatism of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 541, 552 (1987)
(explaining that "a pragmatic coherence theory of truth sees truth as a coherence among
ideas").
78 Cf Richard E. Redding, Reconstructing Science Through Law, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 585,
602 (1999) (listing "the three greatest surprises to our common sense understanding of the
world... : the discovery that the earth is round, Darwin's theory of evolution, and the
discovery of the unconscious mind").
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inconsistency"; 79 it is neither universal nor systematically collected and
analyzed.80 "Common sense," wrote anthropologist Nancy Levitt, "is
dependent on cultural fabric, on social, ethnic, and geographic variations,
and on historical traditions."8' This list ought to include the power elite's
influential, privileged view of reality. 2
Holmes faced-off against classical jurisprudence, which dominated
legal thought in the nineteenth century83 and provided the foundation for
laissez-faire constitutionalism.84  Classical jurisprudence defined law as
asocial; it spoke of immutable concepts, and divided and subdivided the
legal cannon into mutually exclusive categories and a priori principles.
8 5
Judging primarily entailed finding the correct legal solution within the
79 GEERTZ, supra note 18, at 88.
80 See, e.g., Sherwin, supra note 72, at 737:
Since common sense is unself-conscious, it neither seeks, nor could it achieve, the consistent and
systematic deployment of principles that characterize other ways of thinking and talking.
Indeed, the exponent of common sense rarely considers that her knowledge has a conceptual
basis. For common sense, reality is tangible, and ideas, concepts, and metaphors simply provide
the means to describe it.
See also GEERTZ, supra note 18, at 85 (characterizing common sense as
"immethodological[]"). For an unorthodox view of common sense, see Jennifer Nedelsky,
Communities of Judgment and Human Rights, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 245, 250 (2000)
("For Kant, the ground for the 'common sense' is the identical cognitive faculties of
imagination and understanding that all human beings share.").
81 Nancy Levitt, Practically Unreasonable: A Critique of Practical Reason. A Review of
the Problems of Jurisprudence, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 494, 502 (1991) (book review).
82 See Redding, supra note 78, at 602 ("[The law's common sense] tends to represent the
wisdom of society's power elites, privileging their view(s) of reality."); see also Levitt,
supra note 81, at 513 ("[Llegitimating the dominant voice to the exclusion of others,
common' sense marginalizes outgroups.").
83 See Andrew M. Jacobs, God Save This Postmodern Court: The Death of Necessity and
the Transformation of the Supreme Court's Overruling Rhetoric, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 1119,
1122-23 (1995) (discussing the impact of classical jurisprudence on nineteenth century legal
thought).
84 See Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1151, 1193-1219
(1985) (addressing the "liberty of contract era" and its formalistic distinction between the
"public" and "private" realms of social life).
85 See Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of
Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 251, 255 (1997) (describing the
classical model and identifying it with Harvard's Christopher Columbus Langdell).
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unchanging legal cannon.86 Logic, uncontaminated by culture, supposedly
dictated the outcome.87
In turn, classical jurisprudence placed law on a doctrinal level
distinctly superior to and apart from fact. Often fact-finding constituted
little more than guesses and hunches. "[T]here was little place for empirical
reality" in classical jurisprudence. 88
Oliver Wendell Holmes would have none of this. "Holmes,"
according to one commentator, "argued that the meaning of law as well as
the nature of truth is contingent upon events, competition, and historical
context." 89 For Holmes, classical jurisprudence fell woefully short of its
claims of objectivity and autonomy. 90 His was a sociological jurisprudence,
resting on a foundation of pragmatism 9' and empiricism. 92 According to
Holmes, law should be purposive: what counts is the welfare of the
86 See John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and
Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 477, 479 (1986) ("At the turn of this
century, American law was dominated by classical jurisprudence-the belief that a single,
correct legal solution could be reached in every case by the application of logic to a set of
natural, self-evident principles.").
87 See id. (concluding that classical jurisprudence viewed adjudication "to be purely
rational and exclusively deductive and thus produced a formal and mechanical approach to
decisionmaking").
88 Rachel N. Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of
Fundamental Rights, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 655, 658 (1987) ("In the world of 'natural law'
there was little place for empirical reality.").
89 Gary Minda, One Hundred Years of Modern Legal Thought: From Langdell and
Holmes to Posner and Schlag, 28 IND. L. REv. 353, 376 (1995).
90 See Catharine Pierce Wells, Holmes on Legal Method: The Predictive Theory of Law
as an Instance of Scientific Method, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 329, 335 (1994) ("For Holmes, legal
logic shaped legal decision making but it was only a part of the story.").
91 See Grey, supra note 76, at 788 ("[W]hile there are indeed multiple and apparently
clashing strands in Holmes' thought, most of them weave together reasonably well when
seen as the jurisprudential development of certain central tenets of American pragmatism.");
see generally Hantzis, supra note 77, at 545 (observing that Holmes' jurisprudence is
difficult to classify because he embraced several intellectual traditions over the course of his
adult life).
92 See Heidi Margaret Hurd, Relativistic Jurisprudence: Skepticism Founded on
Confusion, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1417, 1432 (1988) (footnote omitted):
Yet while Holmes' skepticism invited the criticism of those suspicious of relativistic or
subjectivist ethics, few who followed him questioned Holmes' conclusion that the law is an
empirical science rather than an axiomatic formal system excluding all value choices by judges.
As Pound was to acknowledge, Holmes ushered in "sociological jurisprudence"-the
philosophical precursor of legal realism.
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majority; toward that end, judges should embrace empiricism so as to
render law a social science both in content and method.93
The Great Depression and the political triumph of the New Dealers led
to the ascendancy of sociological jurisprudence. Whereas classical
jurisprudence built a towering conceptual wall between law and fact,
sociological jurisprudence put them on equal footing, rendering law and
fact codependent because the truth of an idea-in the Constitution or
elsewhere-turns on its "verif[ication] in the real world., 94
The sociological jurisprudence practiced by the New Deal Court,95 and
arguably by every subsequent Court, rendered equal protection the product
96of balancing various interests. These interests, according to Roscoe
Pound, consisted of individual interests, governmental interests, and social
interests.97  Yet balancing greatly depended upon empiricism; through
empirical observations one assigned "weight" to various interests.
Moreover, the validity of an interest rested in part on empirical facts.98
How can judges evaluate putative "empirical facts" without
"legislating" from the bench? Indeed, ad hoc balancing would grant judges
open-range upon which to sow their ideological preferences. 99 For Holmes
93 See Phillip Thompson, Silent Protest: A Catholic Justice Dissents in Buck v. Bell, 43
CATH. LAW. 125, 131 (2004) ("As a jurist, Holmes demonstrated these utilitarian sympathies
in his consequential reasoning. The ends are selected not because of any historical, cultural,
or a priori rules or principles, but flow from current opinion. The aim of the law is to
efficiently design public policy to implement these desires.") (footnote omitted).
94 WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM, A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF THINKING:
POPULAR LECTURES IN PHILOSOPHY 201 (1907).
95 See Logan Everett Sawyer III, Jurisdiction, Jurisprudence, and Legal Change:
Sociological Jurisprudence and the Road to International Shoe, 10 GEO. MASON L. REv. 59,
86 (2001) ("When the Supreme Court handed down International Shoe in 1945, all but one
member of the court owed his position to FDR. These new Justices not only shared FDR's
political philosophy, but most of them also supported the basic tenets of sociological
jurisprudence.").
96 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.J. 943, 945 (1987) (defining balancing as "the identification, valuation, and comparison of
competing interests"); Sullivan, supra note 63, at 60 n.238 (defining balancing as "standard-
like in that it explicitly considers all relevant factors with an eye to the underlying purposes
or background principles or policies at stake").
97 See Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1943).
98 See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Three Objections to the Use of Empiricism in Criminal
Law and Procedure-And Three Answers, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 851, 855 ("Balancing
analyses lend themselves to assessments of empirical research."); Daniel J. Solove, The
Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA L. REv. 941,
954 (2000) ("At its very foundations, judicial balancing is an approach to judicial review that
emphasizes the importance of factual and empirical data.").
99 See Eugene Gressman & Angela C. Carnella, The RFRA Revision of the Free Exercise
Clause, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 65, 80 (1996) (recounting the "severe criticism" leveled at ad hoc
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and the legion that embraced his pragmatism, the answer lay in deference to
legislative facts.'00 Given the centrality of facts to the balancing process,
deference of this sort, what Kathleen Sullivan calls "deferential
balancing,"'0' almost assures that the government interest will prevail.
0 2
Deference of this sort also concerned Justice Harlan Fiske Stone.
However, he feared for unpopular and powerless minority religious, racial,
and ethnic groups; their "spoiled" identities10 3 made it unlikely that they
would receive empathy from the majoritarian branches of government.'0 4
balancing and acknowledging that "ad hoc balancing smacks of indeterminacy and
subjectivity").
100 As R. Randall Kelso described,
[flor a Holmesian, it is up to the legislature and executive to respond to social change and "the
felt necessities of the times," not the courts. Reflecting this fact, virtually all Holmesian
references to a notion of evolving concepts in the Constitution occur in the context of deference
to governmental decision.
R. Randall Kelso, Styles of Constitutional Interpretation and the Four Main Approaches to
Constitutional Interpretation in American Legal History, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 121, 199
(1994) (footnotes omitted); see also G. EDWARD WHrrE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES:
LAW AND THE INNER SELF 487 (1993) (excepting his First Amendment views, Holmes
"pioneered the development of 'deferential' judging in a majoritarian constitutional
democracy").
101 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and
Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 295 (1993).
102 See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993) ("On rational-basis
review, a classification in a statute.., comes to us bearing a strong presumption of
validity ....") (citation omitted); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (positing that the
party challenging the constitutionality of a statute must negate "every conceivable basis
which might support [it]" it (quoting Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S.
356, 364 (1973))).
103 See ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY
43 (1963). Goffman defines a "spoiled identity" as contaminated by "stigma," that is, "an
attribute that is deeply discrediting," such as a criminal conviction. Id. at 3. He delineates
three kinds of stigma: 1) "abominations of the body," such as physical deformities; 2)
"blemishes of individual character," which would include imprisonment; and 3) "tribal
stigma of race, nation, and religion." Id. at 4.
104 See Robert W. Bennett, Reflections on the Role of Motivation Under the Equal
Protection Clause, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 1009, 1015 (1984) (concluding that Carolene
Products' minorities were to receive special judicial protection because they are not likely
"to be treated empathetically in the political arena"). In turn, footnote four gave rise to "the
countermajoritarian difficulty":
[Mlost of the important policy decisions are made by our elected representatives (or by people
accountable to them) .... Judges, at least federal judges-while they obviously are not entirely
oblivious to popular opinion-are not elected or reelected. "[Niothing can finally depreciate the
central function that is assigned in democratic theory and practice to the electoral process; nor
can it be denied that the policy-making power of representative institutions, born of the electoral




In footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products,10 5 Justice Stone
outlined what would become the prevailing multi-tiered model of equal
protection.' °6 The most famous footnote written by the Court,' ° 7 it called
for "more searching" or "more exacting" judicial inquiry-and thus the
absence of deference-when government action limited the exercise of
specific textual rights, interfered with democratic processes, or
discriminated against "discrete and insular minorities."
108
Sociological jurisprudence's embrace of social facts and footnote
four's concern for empathy-deprived minorities found expression in Brown
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 4 (1982) (quoting ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 19 (1978)).
105 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
106 See supra note 19 (discussing the various tiers of scrutiny); see also ELY, supra note
104, at 75 (asserting that footnote four foreshadowed the groundbreaking decisions of the
Warren Court); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Products Dead?
Reflections on Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 CAL. L.
REv. 686, 690 (1991) (stating that "[f]ootnote four encompasses much of the ensuing half-
century of constitutional law"); cf Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82
COLUM. L. REv. 1087, 1088 (1982) ("[M]any scholars think [footnote four] actually
commenced a new era in constitutional law."). But see, e.g., Geoffrey Miller, The True Story
of Carolene Products, in 1987 SuP. CT. REV. 397, 428 (Philip B. Kurland et al., eds., 1988)
("The political theory underlying the Carolene Products footnote needs to be updated.");
Lawrence Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89
YALE L.J. 1063, 1064 (1980) (implying that footnote four is "radically indeterminate and
fundamentally incomplete").
107 See, e.g., LIEF H. CARTER, CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL LAWMAKING 86 (1985)
(describing footnote four as "the commonly cited justification for.., active [judicial]
protection of civil rights and liberties"); Pamela S. Karlan, Note, Discriminatory Purpose
and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 93 YALE L.J. 111, 115 n.25
(1983) (observing that "[t]he famous ... footnote four first suggests that the normal
presumption of constitutionality may not operate in cases involving certain distinctions").
10' Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when
legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as
those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced
within the Fourteenth ....
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political processes
which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be
subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth
Amendment ....
Nor need we inquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at
particular religious.., or national ... or racial minorities: whether prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a specific condition, which tends seriously to curtail and operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for
a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
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v. Board of Education.10 9 Demonstrating "special solicitude" to powerless
and stigmatized African Americans, Chief Justice Warren, writing for the
Court, invoked social science research to rebut the Plessy Court's assertion
that the separation of the races did not communicate inferiority." °
Nowhere did the plain-spoken Chief Justice invoke "common sense" in
finding that the "separate but equal" doctrine created "inherently unequal"
segregation.' 11
Whereas the Brown Court had forsaken deference to state lawmakers,
nearly fifty years later the Ninth Circuit made deference the lynchpin of its
ruling in Johnson. It did so at the behest of Turner v. Safley 12 and its
progeny. 13  In requiring constitutional challenges to prison rules to be
evaluated according to its four-pronged test of reasonableness,' 1" 4 the Turner
Court had explicitly sought to constrain judicial activism by the lower
federal courts on behalf of inmates. 15 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit took
deference to one more level: prison officials would be freed from
establishing a factual basis for their actions if common sense bridged the
empirical gap between segregating inmates and advancing institutional
security.116 Ironically, sociological jurisprudence had spawned such anxiety
109 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
110 See id. at 495 n. 11. "Footnote 11 was merely a list of seven works by contemporary
social scientists," wrote Richard Kluger, who quotes Warren's law clerk as follows: "The
only reason for having included footnote #11 was as a rebuttal to the cheap psychology of
Plessy that said inferiority [arising from segregation] was only in the mind of the Negro."
KLUGER, supra note 5, at 705-06.
.. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
112 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
13 See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131-36 (2003) (ruling that institutional
regulations restricting prisoner visitation satisfied the Turner test); Thornburgh v. Abbott,
490 U.S. 401, 419 (1989) (ruling that institutional regulations restricting the receipt of
prescription publications satisfied the Turner test); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S.
342, 350-53 (1987) (ruling that institutional regulations restricting prisoners' exercise of
religion satisfied the Turner test).
114 See supra note 51 (delineating the four prongs).
115 Writing for the Supreme Court in Turner, Justice O'Connor rejected application of
the strict scrutiny test to prison regulations limiting inmate correspondence. Turner, 482
U.S. at 89. Strict scrutiny, she explained, would require federal courts to "become the
primary arbiters of what constitutes the best solution to every administrative problem ... 
Id.
116 The Supreme Court in Overton came close to embracing common sense. It viewed
empirical data about prison visitation as irrelevant and instead upheld the regulations
because one could hypothesize a rational relationship between the resulting restrictions and a
penal objective. See Overton, 539 U.S. at 133 ("MDOC's regulation prohibiting visitation
by former inmates bears a self-evident connection to the State's interest in maintaining
prison security and preventing future crimes.") (emphasis added).
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about judicial activism that the Ninth Circuit openly embraced "one of the
intellectually weakest methods of analysis" 17 -common sense.
B. A PRIMER ON COMMON SENSE RACISM
Everybody knows race in America but not everybody is conscious of
race. I am conscious of the race of my sole African American colleague,
but not of myself as a white person or the whiteness of the other
departmental professors. In turn, I am conscious of the nation's racism,118
but I am rarely conscious of the privileged position that my whiteness has
provided to me. Barbara Flagg, also a white professor, describes lack of
white race consciousness as "the transparency phenomenon," which denotes
"[t]he tendency of whites not to think about whiteness, or about norms,
behaviors, experiences, or perspectives that are white-specific."119 My lack
of white consciousness is hardly accidental. As Grace Elizabeth Hale
observed in her study of the social construction of the white identity in the
pre-Brown South:
Central to the meaning of whiteness is a broad, collective American silence. The
denial of white as a racial identity, the denial that whiteness has a history, allows the
quiet, the blankness, to stand as the norm. This erasure enables many to fuse their
absence of racial being with the nation, making whiteness their unspoken but deepest
sense of what it means to be an American.
120
Because the transparency phenomenon thrives on presupposed
beliefs, 121 white people fail to recognize that common sense incorporates
"cultural identity norms,"'' 22 a subset of which contain shared meanings and
assumptions about race, including pejorative notions about people of color.
117 Levitt, supra note at 81, at 502.
118 See Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice; Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break
the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REv. 733, 739 (1995):
Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which racism has played and still
plays a dominant role. Because of this shared experience, we also inevitably share many ideas,
attitudes, and beliefs that attach significance to an individual's race and induce negative feelings
and opinions about nonwhites. To the extent that this cultural belief system has influenced all of
us, we are all racists.
119 Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953, 969 (1993).
120 HALE, supra note 41, at xi.
121 Cf Frits van Holthoon & David R. Olson, Common Sense: An Introduction, in
COMMON SENSE, supra note 72, at 1, 2-3 (describing common sense as "sufficiently
ambiguous to incorporate not only knowledge but also judgment").
122 See Frank Rudy Cooper, Cultural Context Matters: Terry's "Seesaw Effect, " 56
OKLA. L. REv. 833, 844-45 (2003) (defining cultural identity norms as "the set of prevailing




Consequently, common sense can-and often does-effect a disguised
endorsement of white racial superiority.
Let me elaborate. As a storehouse for "local knowledge," common
sense among whites includes ideas about race ("racial ideas"), and, as Ian
Haney L6pez observes, "[w]hen we uncritically rely on racial ideas, we
often, in turn, practice racism."'123  Haney L6pez and others speak of
"racism as common sense' 124 or "common sense racism.' 125 For Haney
L6pez, common sense racism is no sideshow. "Common sense is so
integral to racism in the contemporary United States," he writes, "that I
suggest a new definition: racism is action arising out of racial common
sense and enforcing racial hierarchy." 
126
John Brewer introduced the concept of common sense in addressing
racism confronting blacks in the United Kingdom. 127 He tentatively defined
common sense racism as a "finite set of pejorative everyday maxims,
beliefs and ideas about race, which are taken-for-granted and are
widespread and which predicate a widespread set of taken-for-granted
'official' and everyday activities and practices toward blacks." 128
Haney L6pez, who provides us with the most thorough examination of
common sense racism, locates its content in widely shared "background
ideas of race."' 129 These "background ideas," the counterpart to Brewer's
"pejorative everyday maxims," constitute a racialized subset of cultural
identity norms, i.e., the prevailing assumptions about identity found in a
culture, which "compete to be perceived as the common sense
interpretation."'130 Because they are culturally received, "background ideas
of race" seem, according to Haney L6pez, "natural and inevitable ... that
everything is normal and alright."'131 Hence, Haney L6pez posits that one
123 HANEY LOPEZ, supra note 71, at 7.
124 Id.
125 See, e.g., JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE
HIDDEN COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 73-77 (1997).
126 HANEY LOPEZ, note 71, at 127.
127 See Brewer, supra note 13.
128 Id. at 68.
129 HANEY L6PEZ, supra note 71, at 127; see also Marlee Kline, Race, Racism, and
Feminist Legal Theory, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 115, 120 n.16 (1989) ("Whereas clearly
stated racism definitely exists, the more problematic aspect for us is this common sense
racism .... It is in these diffused normalized sets of assumptions, knowledge, and so-called
cultural practices that we come across racism in its most powerful, because pervasive, form."
(quoting Himani Bannerji, Introducing Racism: Notes Towards an Anti-Racism Feminism,
16 RESOURCES FOR FEMINIST RESEARCH/DOCUMENTATION 10, 11 (1987))).
130 Cooper, supra note 122, at 845.
131 HANEY L6PEZ, supra note 71, at 249.
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does not have to consciously intend to be racist to hold common sense racist
views. 132  Conversely, good intentions do not preclude judges from
embracing cultural identity norms that foster racial hierarchy.
133
C. COMMON SENSE RACISM ON THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In a thinly veiled reference to his fellow Ninth Circuit judges, the lone
dissenter in the en banc session of the court in Johnson lamented, "our
society, as well as our prisons, contains an abundance of persons who
believe that any cross-racial interaction is dangerous, regardless of whether
their beliefs are based in fact.' ' 134 His brethren had no need for "fact."
They trusted their common sense. However, their common sense portrait of
inmates is a racialized one grounded in part in pejorative cultural
stereotypes of imprisoned young black men-the very stuff of common
sense racism.
John Sloop's The Cultural Prison provides a gallery of portraits of
inmates incarcerated between 1950 and 1993.35 The gallery's collection
from the 1950s reveals a homogenous inmate subculture consisting of three
attributes: 1) inmates' white skin; 136 2) their capacity for altruism, as
illustrated by the inmates who became guinea pigs for pharmaceutical
companies and research institutions; 137 and 3) their capacity for redemption,
as portrayed in warden Clinton Duffy's telling description of "men behind
bars... [as] human beings in trouble and in need of a helping hand."1 38
The next two eras, from 1960 to 1974 and 1975 to 1993, reveal a chasm
within the inmate population. From the increasingly racialized prison
emerged two new inmate portraits: the caring and redeemable white
132 See id. at 128.
133 See id. at 129; see also Charles R. Lawrence 111, The Id, The Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317, 356 (1987) (writing
that "[i]n a society that no longer condones overt racist attitudes and behavior, many of these
attitudes will be repressed and prevented from reaching awareness in an undisguised form").
134 Johnson v. California, 336 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003) (Ferguson, J., dissenting
from denial of Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc), rev 'd, 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
135 See JOHN M. SLOOP, THE CULTURAL PRISON 31-185 (1996). Sloop acknowledges that
the media must operate within the boundaries of what is "ideologically acceptable" to its
audience. Id. at 11.
136 See id. at 56-57 (observing that non-whites are conspicuously absent from depictions
of this era).
137 See id. at 34-36 (observing that it was "common practice" for inmates to be test
subjects).
138 Id. at 38.
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inmate,139 and the incorrigible, naturally violent, and irrational African
American inmate, who possesses these attributes because of his race.
140
How would Sloop describe the prisoner of the twenty-first century?
The demise of the rehabilitative ideal 141 and the ascendancy of the penal
harm movement 42 have led to the collective devaluation of all inmates.
Regardless of race, their cultural image is "spoiled"' 143 if for no other reason
than their imprisonment. "Doing time" constitutes a highly durable "stigma
symbol," that is, "an attribute that is deeply discrediting."' 44 The "pains of
imprisonment"--restrictions on liberty, personal goods and services,
heterosexual relationships, autonomy, and safety145-all serve to mark the
offender as "not one of us." Indeed, "[t]he status lost by the prisoner,"
observed Gresham Sykes, "is, in fact, similar to ... the status of
citizenship-that basic acceptance of the individual as a functioning
member of the society in which he lives."'146 Justice Stevens got it right
when he wrote that "[p]risoners are truly the outcasts of society.' 47
Nor is the "spoiled" character of inmate washed clean upon his
departure from prison. The cultural construction of the prison-as-revolving-
door, replete with high rates of re-imprisonment, In4 conveys the once-an-
... See id. at 65-71, 92-102.
140 See id. at 154-67 (observing that white prisoner violence is viewed as the result of
social conditions, but African Americans are "violent and irrational regardless of
conditions").
141 See Francis A. Allen, Criminal Justice, Legal Values and the Rehabilitative Ideal, 50
J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 226, 226-27 (1959) (defining the rehabilitative ideal
as the notion that crime arises from antecedent causes and consequently offenders ought to
be rehabilitated).
142 See Francis T. Cullen, Assessing the Penal Harm Movement, 32 J. RES. CRIME &
DELiNQ. 338, 340 (1995) (charging that "creative strategies to make offenders suffer" has
become the goal of penal policy). The penal harm movement finds its ideological origins in
the English Poor Laws of the nineteenth century and the principle of less eligibility-that
inmates should live no better than the poorest of the poor. See, e.g., LEON RADZINOWICZ &
ROGER HOOD, THE EMERGENCE OF PENAL POLICY IN VICTORIAN AND EDWARDIAN ENGLAND
339-55 (1990) (discussing the origins and impact of the Poor Law Act of 1834 in England
and Wales); Edward W. Sieh, Less Eligibility: The Upper Limits of Penal Policy, 3 CRIM.
JUST. POL'Y REv. 159, 159-60 (1989) (identifying the origins and concept of less eligibility).
143 See GOFFMAN, supra note 103, at 43 (defining a "spoiled" identity).
144 Id.
145 GRESHAM M. SYKES, THE SOCIETY OF CAPTIVES 65-78 (1958).
146 Id. at 66-67 (footnote omitted).
147 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 557 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
148 See James Austin, The Proper Use of Risk Assessment in Corrections, 16 FED. SENT.
RPT. 194, 2004 WL 2189131, at *3 (2004):
The data show that, by in large, there has been no change in the recidivism rates between
prisoners released in 1983 and those released in 1994. While the return to prison rate is not as
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outlaw, always-an-outlaw representation of prisoners. Jack Henry Abbott, a
self-described "fanatically defiant and alienated individual who cannot
[imagine] what forgiveness is, or mercy or tolerance, because he has no
experience of such values,"' 149 embodies this representation. In his life,
where not even fame can prevent his returning to the prison for a homicide
committed after his sixth week of freedom, 150 we envisage a penal system
that fails to punish adequately. 151 Hence, offenders leave prison without
having paid their full debt to society and are rightly subject to social
exclusion via disenfranchisement and other civil disabilities. 52
For the African American inmate, the "spoilage" has festered in a
cultural environment that envisages crime and imprisonment as colored
black. Media representations of crime, 153 the public's racial typification of
crime,154 and the mass incarceration of young African American men' 55
have reinforced a historic and widely shared stereotype: the black male as
"fearsome, threatening, unemployed, irresponsible, potentially dangerous,
high as some might believe (about 40 percent), the data also show that over 60% of offenders are
being re-arrested, albeit for mostly property and drug related crimes. Only about half of the
returns to prison are for new felony convictions with the other half being for technical violations.
149 JACK HENRY ABBOTT, IN THE BELLY OF THE BEAST: LETTERS FROM PRISON 13
(Vintage Books ed. 1991) (1981).
150 Jack Henry Abbott, author of In the Belly of the Beast, which chronicled a life spent
almost entirely behind bars, committed homicide shortly after his much publicized release
from prison. See Stephen D. Sowle, A Regime of Social Death: Criminal Punishment in the
Age of Prisons, 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 497, 502-03 (1994) (recounting the tragic
life of Abbott).
151 See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF LAW AND ORDER: STREET CRIME AND
PUBLIC POLICY 64 (1984) (describing the public perception that the prison failed to punish
adequately as the "myth of crime and punishment").
152 See infra notes 309-11 and accompanying text (examining the civil disabilities that
attach to a felony conviction).
153 See Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr. et al., Crime in Black and White: The Violent, Scary
World of Local News, 1 HARV. INT'L J. PRESS/POLITICS 6, 8 (1996) (describing how the
media activates pre-existing, pejorative stereotypes).
154 See MATTHEW SILBERMAN, A WORLD OF VIOLENCE 194 (1995) (stating that the large-
scale incarceration of inner-city African Americans "identifies blacks with criminality in the
public mind, at least for the white public"); Ted Chiricos et al., Racial Typification of Crime
and Support for Punitive Measures, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 359, 360, 380 (2004) (describing a
"belief system" that "essentializes race in terms of crime and crime in terms of race, thereby
'demonizing' blacks as the locus of threat"); Donna Coker, Foreword: Addressing the Real
World of Racial Discrimination in Criminal Justice, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827, 864
(2003) (addressing "the deeply embedded belief among whites of black criminality").
155 See PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS
IN 2004, at 8 tbl.11 (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs//pub/pdf/p04.pdf
(indicating that at the close of 2004, per 100,000 black males in the nation, there were 3,218
black male inmates, as juxtaposed to 1,220 Hispanic male inmates per 100,000 Hispanic
males and 463 white male inmates per 100,000 white males).
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and generally socially pathological. 156  As a slave, he was the "loyal
Negro." 157 After emancipation, he became the "beast rapist. '1 8 Today, he
is in the mold of Willie Horton-the Republican poster child for coddled
convicted rapists.15 9
The prison itself comes well equipped to embrace, magnify, and
transmit the social construction of the bestial black man. First, this
institution's most basic day-to-day social practices represent racialized
knowledge-"embedded social practices that reflect racial thinking.'
160
Witness the following similarities between prison social practices and
plantation slavery:
(1) [prisoners'] keepers, like the keepers of slaves, dictate routine daily activities; (2)
just as slaves typically lived in remote areas, inmates often ["do time"] far from major
cities; and (3) inmates' cultural insignia of "hard labor," distinctive dress, and the
"clanking of chains" mirror that of slavery.161
In addition, the prison both pressures and rewards African American
inmates to live the cultural myth of the bestial black man. It does so
through the sexualized norms of the inmate subculture that prize
156 Joan W. Howarth, Representing Black Male Innocence, I J. GENDER, RACE & JUST.
97, 104 (1997); see also, e.g., Jewelle Taylor Gibbs, Young Black Males in America:
Endangered, Embittered, and Embattled, in YOUNG, BLACK, AND MALE IN AMERICA: AN
ENDANGERED SPECIES 1, 2-3 (Jewelle Taylor Gibbs ed. 1988) (observing that "young black
males are stereotyped by the five 'd's': dumb, deprived, dangerous, deviant, and disturbed");
HASSINE ET AL., supra note 34, at 71 (stating that white prison staff "seemed to believe that
only white inmates could be reformed into law-abiding citizens"); KATHRYN RUSSELL, THE
COLOR OF CRIME 3 (1998) (stating that "the picture that comes to mind when most of us
think about crime is the picture of a young Black man"); N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park
Five: The Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the Bestial Black Man, 25 CARDOzO L. REv.
1315, 1320 (2004) (examining the "persistence of the mythic Bestial Black Man"); D.
Marvin Jones, "We're All Struck Here for a While ": Law and the Social Construction of the
Black Male, 24 J. CONTEMP. L. 35, 57 (1998) (concluding that African American men are
essentialized as "super masculine menial").
157 HALE, supra note 41, at 73.
158 See id.
159 See SILBERMAN, supra note 154, at 194-95 ("The symbolism of a black Willie Horton
raping a white woman used by a Republican presidential campaign still evokes the fears of
white Americans of black maleness and sexuality that produced lynchings in the Old
South.").
160 See Haney L6pez, supra note 68, at 243.
161 Robertson, supra note 38, at 135 (footnote omitted) (quoting Adam J. HIRSCH, THE
RISE OF THE PENITENTIARY 71 (1992)); see also CARROLL, supra note 38, at 131 (noting that
some plantation terminology finds expression in the contemporary prison); MALCOLM M.
FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE 155-57
(1998) (noting that the slave plantation and some of its traditions provided the model for the
prisons of the American South).
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hypermasculinity 162 and deem acts of violence, including sexual assault, as
validation of "real man" status.163 "[W]eakness is shunned and strength is
worshipped" by inmates of all races as well as by prison personnel. 164
Because staff cannot, and in some instances will not ensure their safety, 165
otherwise non-violent inmates must be willing to do battle with their fellow
inmates. 166 Any lesser measure can render the inmate a "non-man," a status
deplored by inmates 167 and prison workers alike. 168
162 See, e.g., Carl Bryan Holmberg, The Culture of Transgression: Initiations into the
Homosociality of a Midwestern State Prison, in PRISON MASCULINITIES 78, 89 (Don Sabo et
al. eds., 2001) (describing the social relationships among men in prison as "magnif[ying]
masculinity, taking it to the extremes of hypermasculinity"); Wilbert Rideau & Billy
Sinclair, Prison: The Sexual Jungle, in MALE RAPE: A CASEBOOK OF SEXUAL AGGRESSIONS
3, 5 (Anthony M. Scacco, Jr. ed., 1982) (describing the prison as "ultramasculine").
163 See Lee H. Bowker, Victimizers and Victims in American Correctional Institutions, in
THE PAINS OF IMPRISONMENT 63, 64 (Robert Johnson & Hans Toch ed., 1988) ("[V]ictories
in the field of battle reassure the winners of their competence as human beings in the face of
the passivity enforced by institutional regulations. This is particularly important for
prisoners whose masculinity is threatened by the conditions of confinement.").
164 SILBERMAN, supra note 154, at 2.
165 See, e.g., Peter Scharf, Empty Bars: Violence and the Crisis of Meaning in Prison, in
PRISON VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 27, 28 (Michael C. Braswell et al., 2d ed. 1994) (noting that
"[p]risons are largely unable to protect the physical safety of their inmates"); James E.
Robertson, "Fight or F. .." and Constitutional Liberty: An Inmate's Right to Self-Defense
when Targeted by Aggressors, 29 IND. L. REv. 339, 339 (1995) (documenting that "staff
cannot or will not protect [inmate] from rape, assault, and other forms of victimization")
(footnote and citation omitted); Note, Sexual Assaults and Forced Homosexual Relationships
in Prison: Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 36 ALB. L. REv. 429, 438 (1972) (concluding that
victims of prison assaults "receive little protection from prison authorities").
166 See Robertson, supra note 165, at 345 ("To 'make it' in prison ... requires one to
embrace intimidation and violence as operative principles of everyday life.") (footnote
omitted).
167 See James E. Robertson, A Punk's Song About Prison Reform, 24 PACE L. REv. 527,
534 (2004) (explaining that an inmate who does not fight but seeks the protection of another
inmate in exchange for sexual activity becomes a "punk," an otherwise heterosexual inmate
who assumes a passive, "female" role and thus descends to the bottom of the inmate status
system).
168 See, e.g., James E. Robertson, A Clean Heart and an Empty Head: The Supreme
Court and Sexual Terrorism in Prison, 81 N.C. L. REv. 433, 446 (2003) ("In their eyes,
inmates who refrain from combat become unworthy of protection.") (footnote omitted)
[hereinafter Robertson, A Clean Heart]; James E. Robertson, Cruel and Unusual Punishment
in United States Prisons: Sexual Harassment Among Male Inmates, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1,
43 (1999) (observing that "inmates who do not fight are seen by some prison workers as
unworthy of protection") (footnote omitted).
Some staff accept inmate-on-inmate violence--especially inmate-on-inmate rape-as
legitimate, extra-legal punishment. See, e.g., HASSINE ET AL., supra note 34, at 176 ("Some
staff members now seem to view prison rape as part of the punishment-risk that lawbreakers
take when they commit their crimes. Others see it simply as retribution carried out at an
interpersonal level."); Robertson, A Clean Heart, supra note 168, at 446 ("According to
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For correctional officers, whose historic whiteness renders them
vulnerable to common sense racism,' 69 the cultural image of the bestial
black man has led them to warn of a racial "blood bath" featuring the
prison's racial groups.1 70 Their ranks included an associate warden in the
Johnson litigation, who "testified that if race were [sic] not considered...
there would [likely] be racially based conflict in the cells and in the
yard.' 7 1 Studies do suggest that prison assaults more often than not pit
African American aggressors against white inmates, 172 but factors other
than race may be at play, such as perceptions of who is most vulnerable.
173
In Texas, a state with a huge and diverse prison population, 74 rates of
interracial and intraracial violence are about equal. 175 Moreover, rates of
assault did not rise after the desegregation of Texas prison cells. 1
76
The Ninth Circuit's "common-sense" drew upon an additional feature
of the African American inmate's cultural portrait: he is a likely gang
member 177 and thus even more dangerous. Inmate Garrison Johnson had
some inmates, staff regard rape as a legitimate deterrent to crime and a just dessert for its
commission.").
Prison staff also use violence as a management tool. See, e.g., Helen M. Eigenberg,
Correctional Officers' Definitions of Rape in Male Prisons, 28 J. CRIM, JUST. 435, 437
(2000) ("[P]erhaps officers may tolerate coercive acts because they facilitate divisions
among inmates, making them, as a group, more manageable.").
169 See JACOBS, supra note 25, at 160 (observing that correctional officials historically
have been drawn from conservative rural areas, where racial prejudice was prevalent). See
generally Robert Freeman, Correctional Officers: Understood and Misunderstood, in
PRISONS TODAY AND TOMORROW 306 (Jocelyn M. Pollock ed., 1997) (examining the
working environment of the prison guard).
170 POLLOCK, supra note 38, at 106.
171 Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 542 U.S. 499 (2005).
172 See Richard Tewksbury, Fear of Sexual Assault in Prison Inmates, 69 PRIsON J. 62,
63 (1989) (citing studies showing a high frequency of black aggressors).
173 Nobuhle R. Chonco, Sexual Assaults Among Male Inmates: A Descriptive Study, 69
PRISON J. 72, 73 (1989) (speculating that sexual assault of white inmates is related to their
perceived weakness rather than their race per se).
174 See HARRISON & BECK, supra note 155, at 1 (listing Texas as imprisoning 168,105
persons for more than a year in 2004).
175 Chad Trulson & James Marquart, Racial Desegregation and Violence in the Texas
Prison System, 27 CRIM. JUST. REv. 233, 251 (2002) (finding that "[tihe rate of interracial
cell partner assaults was not disproportionate to the rate of intraracial cell partner assaults").
176 Trulson & Marquart, supra note 67, at 774.
177 The California Department of Corrections defines a "gang" as:
[A]ny ongoing formal or informal organization, association or group of three (3) or more
persons, which has a common name or identifying sign or symbol whose members and/or
associates engage or have engaged, on behalf of that organization, association or group, in two or
more activities which include planning, organizing, threatening, financing, soliciting, or
committing unlawful acts or acts of misconduct classified as serious ....
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the misfortunate of "doing time" in an era when gang violence captured the
attention of the media and, consequently, the public. As one study
observed, "[p]rior to 1985, national polls on community problems did not
find that gangs or gang problems registered as a major concern among those
polled; however, by 1994, gang violence ranked as the third most important
issue facing America-behind education and drugs and before crime.'
7 8
Fear of gangs likely led to a moral panic, 179 their ranks demonized as
"carriers of moral disease within the social body,"' 80 with all young black
males being "metaphorical[ly] link[ed]" to gang membership.' 8'
The cultural portrait of a gang member as a person of color departs
considerably from an empirically-drawn account.' 82 Take, for instance, the
exclusively white, non-Hispanic, Aryan Brotherhood.183 Racial bias of a
Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1240 n. 183 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting CALIF. DEP'T OF
CORR., CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS OPERATIONS MANUAL § 55070.16).
178 Charles M. Katz et al., Fear of Gangs: A Test of Alternative Theoretical Models, 20
Jus. Q. 95, 95-96 (2003) (internal source notation omitted). One commentator chronicled the
dramatic transformation of the public's perception of gangs as follows:
Prior to the 1970s, gang violence was usually seen by the public as some version of West Side
Story (1961) male ethnic youths fighting with fists and knives over turf, respect, or romance.
Gang members were typically envisioned as "foreigners," southern European or Latin American
immigrants with hot-blooded, violent ways.
By the 1990s, the movies Scarface (1983), Colors (1988), and New Jack City (1991) had
popularized a different image: cold-blooded minority gangsters shooting it out in drive-bys or
disputes over drugs. The dark foreigner was replaced by the dark African American or Latino.
To the established image of violent gang rivalries was added a lethal mix of drugs, guns, and
easy money.
John M. Hagedorn, Gang Violence in the Post Industrial Era, 24 CRIME & JUST. 365, 367
(1998) (internal source notation omitted).
179 Jodi Lane, Fear of Gang Crime: A Qualitative Examination of the Four Perspectives,
39 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 437, 466 (2002) (presenting several theoretical models that
might explain why fear of gang violence in parts of Southern California exceeded the actual
danger of gang violence, and characterizing fear of gang violence as a "likely local and
national presence of a moral panic about gangs").
180 Howarth, supra note 156, at 124 (internal footnote and quotation marks omitted).
"' Id. at 113.
182 See Paul A. Perrone & Meda Chesney-Lind, Representations of Gangs and
Delinquency: Wild in the Streets?, 24 SOC. JUST. 96, 97 (1997) (finding that "individuals
with the most direct contact with gang members... find media portrayals of gangs to be
especially improbable").
183 See Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Demonizing Youth, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REv.
747, 763 (2001) (footnotes omitted):
[Tihe burden of the demonization of youth and youth gangs falls most heavily on minorities,
especially young minority males. The names entered on gang databases are almost exclusively
those of minorities. Gang membership is so closely associated with minority youth that in some
jurisdictions most of the young minority males are considered by the police to be gang members
or associates. The close association of gang membership and minority status permits politicians
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common sense nature can be faulted: "[t]he overstatement of gang
membership by minorities is often matched by a reluctance to view middle-
class whites as gang members. Groups of White middle-class youth who
engage in delinquent behavior may not be labeled as gangs even when they
have a 'gang name' and wear distinctive 'gang clothing."'
1 84
Prison officials' contention that gangs cause much of the violence in
prisons185 also finds limited empirical support. 186 Besides, gang members
do not constitute a monolithic force: inmates at the periphery of gang life
are no more likely to engage in prison violence than their unaffiliated peers,
and "time in the gang" is negatively related to prison violence.
187
Nonetheless, correctional orthodoxy posits that prison gangs represent
a threat on par with Al Qaeda. As the editor of Corrections Management
Quarterly wrote, "[p]rison gangs.., are very difficult to manage because
they will risk anything and any member to be successful. Correctional
administrators must [consequently] play by a different set of rules .... 88
His countermeasures seem fitting for the global war on terrorism:
The challenge of prison gangs for correctional administrators is that there is never an
end to what must be done to control their behavior .... Correctional administrators
can never hesitate, stop gathering intelligence, or fail to stay ahead of the gangs'
operations. In this sense both sides continuously plot strategies to better position
themselves to counter moves by the other. For the individual correctional staff
and commentators to "play the race card" indirectly.... [Thus] gangs become a proxy for race.
See also Julie Taylor, Racial Segregation in California Prisons, 37 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 139,
150 (2003) (footnotes omitted):
While exceptions do exist, prison gangs are usually formed based on race. In general, Hispanic
gang members join the Mexican Mafia or Nuestra Familia, while black gang members tend to
join the Black Guerilla Family or smaller factions of the Bloods or Crips. White gang members
join the Aryan Brotherhood. There are no known Asian prison gangs.
184 Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Gangs, Schools, and Stereotypes, 37 Loy. L.A.
L. REV. 935, 962 (2004).
185 See Taylor, supra note 184, at 150 (asserting that gangs such as Aryan Brotherhood,
the Black Guerilla Family, the Mexican Mafia, and Nuestra Familia "are responsible for the
steady increase in violence in California prisons").
186 Compare Mary E. Pelz, Gangs, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note
16, at 213 (stating that gang members are five times more involved in violence than
unaffiliated inmates), with Gerald G. Gaes et al., The Influence of Gang Affiliation on
Violence and Prison Misconduct, 82 PRISON J. 359, 359-60 (2002) (finding few studies on
gang violence).
187 Gaes et al., supra note 186, at 374.
188 Richard P. Seiter, Winning a Battle of Wills: Correctional Administrators and Prison
Gangs, 5 CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q. iv, iv (2001); see also Wilkinson v. Austin, 125 S. Ct.
2384, 2396 (2005) ("Clandestine, organized, fueled by race-based hostility, and committed
to fear and violence as a means of disciplining their own members and their rivals, gangs
seek nothing less than to control prison life and to extend their power outside prison walls.").
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involved, their will to further the correctional mission.., cannot waive. They must
be forever diligent in their efforts; otherwise the gangs will win and prisons will not
be safe for staff or inmates.
189
Prison officials have responded to gangs by segregating their supposed
ringleaders in Supermax prisons' 90 on the assumption that a regime of
solitude and sensory deprivation reduces violence throughout a state prison
system by incapacitating "the worst of the worst" and deterring inmates
eager to follow in their violent footsteps. However, a study of Supermax
prisons in several states found no decrease in system-wide institutional
violence after their construction.'91
For California prison officials the "facts" did not seem to matter when
segregating the likes of Garrison Johnson became common sense.
Racialized knowledge had created the stereotype-a black male with a long
history of imprisonment, who invariably becomes a gangbanger-and
Garrison Johnson fit the bill close enough.
192
The CDC's open consideration of race signified another, quite
different stereotype-the overt, "old" racism practiced under Jim Crow. 193
In Part III, the Article examines the response of the Supreme Court to the
189 Seiter, supra note 188, at iv.
190 See Scott N. Tachiki, Indeterminate Sentences in Supermax Prisons Based upon
Alleged Gang Affiliations: A Reexamination of Procedural Protection and a Proposal for
Greater Procedural Requirements, 83 CAL. L. REv. 1115, 1117 (1995) (observing that
"many states have adopted policies that segregate 'known' prison gang members to highly
restrictive 'supermax' prisons").
191 See Chad S. Briggs et al., The Effect of Super Maximum Security Prisons on
Aggregate Levels of Institutional Violence, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 1341, 1367 (2003) (finding that
the opening of Supermax prisons in Minnesota, Illinois, Arizona, and Utah did not decrease
institutional violence in the aggregate in any of their respective prison systems).
192 The Ninth Circuit did not assert that Garrison Johnson belonged to a gang; rather, he
failed to refute the common sense conclusion that violence would rise in the absence of
racial segregation. See Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791, 805 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 543
U.S. 499 (2005).
193 See, e.g., Timothy Davis, Racism in Athletics: Subtle But Persistent, 21 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 881, 883 (1999) (describing "'old-fashioned' racism as being
"expressed directly and openly"); Richard Delgato, Rodrigo's Tenth Chronicle: Merit and
Affirmative Action, 83 GEO. L.J. 1711, 1719 (1994) ("The old kind is overt and takes the
form of laws and social practices that expressly treat blacks and others of color worse than
whites. This type of racism might be typified by whites-only drinking fountains, or
university admissions practices that excluded blacks entirely until about 1965."); Edward
Patrick Boyle, Note, It's Not Easy Bein' Green: The Psychology of Racism, Environmental
Discrimination, and the Argument for Modernizing Equal Protection Analysis, 46 VAND. L.
REv. 937, 944 n.29 (1993) (describing "old" racism as "that [which] manifests itself by




CDC's common sense fears 'of racial conflict and its "separate but equal"
solution.
III. THE JOHNSON CASE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A "TAME" BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION
A. A SYNOPSIS
Johnson represents one of the ironic cases in the history of prisoners'
rights litigation. The CDC, which had been created during Earl Warren's
tenure as Governor of California,194 had awakened the ghost of Homer
Plessy by instituting a "separate but equal" race-based housing scheme) 95
The circuit court reputed to be the most liberal in the United States
196
subsequently found no violation of the Equal Protection Clause 97 based
upon its reading of Turner v. Safley, 198 a decision that had drawn the ire of
the Court's "liberal" wing. 199 Nonetheless, the Rehnquist Court, whose
Chief Justice had found merit in Plessy during his clerkship with the High
Court,200 refused to accommodate the common sense security concerns of
prison officials. 0
194 See David Halley, Richard A. McGee, 1897-1983, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN
PRISONS, supra note 16, at 315, 316 (recounting Warren's creation of the CDC, followed
shortly by his appointment of Richard McGee as head of state corrections, who
professionalized the state prison system).
195 See Johnson, 321 F.3d at 794 (describing the segregation process).
196 See supra note I (discussing the court's liberal reputation).
197 See Johnson, 321 F.3d at 802.
198 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
199 Justices Marshall, Brennan, and Blackmun joined Justice Stevens's dissent in Turner
v. Safley. Stevens feared that wardens could invariably "produce[] ... [some] plausible
security concern" to justify any hardship visited on inmates. Id. at 101 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
200 See Strossen, supra note 75, at 438 n.47 (1997) (recounting discovery of the
Rehnquist's memorandum supporting a "continued endorsement of the old doctrine of
separate but equal"). Note that Chief Justice Rehnquist did not participate in the Johnson
ruling.
201 Compare Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509 (2005) ("In the prison context, the
government's power is at an apex, we think that searching judicial review of racial
classifications is necessary to guard against invidious discrimination."), with, e.g., Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 361 (1996) ("[The] principle of deference has special force with regard
to that issue, since the inmates in lockdown include 'the most dangerous and violent
prisoners in the Arizona prison system,' and other inmates presenting special disciplinary
and security concerns.") (citation omitted); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995)
("[F]ederal courts ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials
trying to manage a volatile environment."); Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992)
('" [P]rison administrators.., should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption
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1. Reviving Strict Scrutiny
In rejecting application of Turner's reasonableness standard test, the
Court suspended its long-standing precept that the very nature of
imprisonment requires a highly constrictive interpretation of constitutional
rights.20 2  For this Court, the most stringent equal protection test-strict
scrutiny-applies to "all racial classifications," including the CDC's.
20 3
Moreover, the Court's use of metaphor presented strict scrutiny as a "deep
structure" test wholly at odds with common sense adjudication.204 While
common sense presupposes the validity of racialized knowledge, the
Johnson Court mandated "'searching judicial inquiry into the justification
for such race-based measures.' 20 5 In contrast to the passive "naturalness"
of common sense, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion called for nothing
short of "smokfingJ out illegitimate uses of race .... 206
Prison officials argued that by "'equally' segrega[ting]" blacks and
whites they evaded the reach of the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 20 7  "Indeed," responded Justice O'Connor, "we
and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal
order and discipline and to maintain institutional security."' (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 547 (1979))); Turner, 482 U.S. at 89 ("[A) standard [of deference] is necessary if
'prison administrators ... and not the courts, [are] to make the difficult judgments
concerning institutional operations."' (quoting Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor
Union, 433 U.S. 119, 128 (1977))); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 589 (1984)
("'[P]rison administrators are [to be] accorded wide-ranging deference ....' (quoting
Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 547)).
202 See, e.g., Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485 ("[L]awful incarceration brings about the necessary
withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the
considerations underlying our penal system." (quoting Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285
(1948))); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983); Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 546 (stating that
"essential goals that may require limitation or retraction of the retained constitutional rights
of both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees"); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 840
(1977) ("Our decisions have recognized on more than one occasion that lawful imprisonment
properly results in a 'retraction [of rights] justified by the considerations underlying our
penal system."' (quoting Price, 334 U.S. at 285)); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556
(1974) ("In sum, there must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs and
objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application.").
203 See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 500 (emphasis added).
204 See Bernard J. Hibbits, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality, and the
Reconfiguration of American Legal Discourse, 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 229, 235 (1994)
("Some scholars. .. suggest that metaphors are fundamental tools of thought and
reasoning-so much a part of the deep structure of our mentality.").
205 Johnson, 543 U.S. at 506 (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493
(1989) (plurality opinion)) (emphasis added).




rejected the notion that separate can ever be equal-or 'neutral'-50 years
ago in Brown v. Board of Education and we refuse to resurrect it today. 20 8
Nor would the Court accept prison officials' argument that possible
racial violence required an exception to strict scrutiny of racial
classifications. 20 9 Whereas "common-sense" fears of racial violence had
carried the day for prison officials before the Ninth Circuit,210 the Court
discounted their forecast of racial strife. It did so largely because an
empirically-based study contradicted the common sense prediction that
integrating Texas prison cells would result in levels of violence without
equal in segregated cells.2 ' Moreover, Justice O'Connor asserted that the
racial segregation of inmates may increase racial violence by
"'[stigmatizing] individuals by reason of their membership in a racial group
and [inciting] racial hostility.' 21 2
While finding the segregated housing the product of "an express racial
classification" and thus "immediately suspect,213 the Court stopped short of
deeming it unconstitutional. As in Lee v. Washington, the Johnson Court
could tolerate "separate but equal" and other "uses of race" for a short while
when "those uses of race.., are narrowly tailored to address" the
208 id.
209 Id. at 507-08.
210 See Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791, 802 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 543 U.S. 499
(2005) ("Given the admittedly high racial tensions and violence already existing within the
CDC, there is clearly a common-sense connection between the use of race as the
predominant factor in assigning cell mates for 60 days until it is clear how the inmate will
adjust to his new environment and reducing racial violence and maintaining a safer
environment."). Prison officials' appeal to deference had previously carried the day time
and time again in the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 361 (1996)
("[The] principle of deference has special force ... "); Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482
(1995) (invoking deference in limiting when procedural safeguards arise in disciplinary
hearings); Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 6 (1992) (invoking deference in limiting cruel
and unusual punishment safeguards); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (invoking
deference in limiting free speech); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 589 (1984) (invoking
deference in limiting search and seizure safeguards); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472
(1983) (invoking deference in limiting procedural safeguards in administrative segregation
decisions).
211 See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 507-08 ("finding that 'over [ten years] the rate of violence
between inmates segregated by race in double cells surpassed the rate among those racially
integrated."' (quoting Trulson & Marquart, supra note 67, at 774)). This albeit modest but
highly effective use of social science research reminds one of Brown's controversial use of
social science findings on the psychological effects of segregation on African Americans in
its footnote 11. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,495 n.11 (1954).
212 Johnson, 543 U.S. at 507 (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 643 (1993)).
213 Id. at 509 (quoting Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642).
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"necessities of prison security and discipline. 214 The Court thus remanded
to the district court for further findings.z 5
2. Redefining the Reach of Turner v. Safley
Prior to Johnson, some lower courts had embraced the Turner test as
the unitary standard for challenges to prison regulations.216 Justice
O'Connor reversed this trend by delimiting Turner's reach "only to rights
that are 'inconsistent with proper incarceration."' 21 7  "Only," however,
seemingly meant all rights but two: the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel
and unusual punishmene18 and the Fourteenth Amendment prohibition of
racial discrimination.21 9 Regarding the latter, Justice O'Connor posited that
"[ilt is not a right that need necessarily be compromised for the sake of
214 Id. at 512 (quoting Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968)).
215 See id. at 515.
216 See, e.g., Doe v. Delie, 257 F.3d 309, 316 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying Turner to a search
and seizure claim); Tillman v. Lebanon County Corr. Facility, 221 F.3d 410, 419 (3d Cir.
2000) (applying Turner to a cruel and unusual punishment claim); Gates v. Rowland, 39
F.3d 1439, 1447 (9th Cir. 1994) (ruling that Turner permits prison staff to limit statutorily
created fights); Klinger v. Dep't of Corr., 31 F.3d 727, 732 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying Turner
to an equal protection claim).
217 Johnson, 543 U.S. at 500 (quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003))
(emphasis added). The editors of the Harvard Law Review properly found this distinction to
be less than clear:
Although prisoner suits pushing on the new boundaries of Turner will surely come, the Court has
done little to assure that they will be resolved in a predictable fashion. The key question that
Johnson passes over, and which underlies the doctrinal confusion it will create, is why prisoners
lose full constitutional protection at all ....
The Johnson Court took a decisive step away from the deference-to-administrators rationale.
The Court can no longer persuasively justify the watering down of prisoners' rights on the basis
of the judiciary's lack of institutional competence when its new threshold test requires lower
courts to decide what constitutes "proper incarceration" or "proper prison administration." In the
place of the older normative accounts of why prisoners must sacrifice their rights, the Johnson
Court offered the conclusory statement that "certain privileges and rights must necessarily be
limited in the prison context." But it is hard to know what is necessary about the prison context.
The Supreme Court, 2004 Term Leading Cases: Application to Incarcerated Persons-
Inmate Racial Segregation, 119 HARV. L. REV. 228, 236-37 (2006) (footnotes omitted).
21' Johnson, 543 U.S. at 511 (explaining that "the integrity of the criminal justice system
depends on full compliance with the Eighth Amendment"); see also Worthen v. Hull, 2005
WL 1950250, at *4 (E.D. Okla. July 29, 2005) (saying "but the Supreme Court has 'not used
Turner to evaluate Eighth Amendment claims of cruel and unusual punishment in prison.'
Rather than apply the Turner standard, the Court 'judge[s] violations of [the Eighth]
Amendment under the 'deliberate indifference' standard .. .- (quoting Johnson, 543 U.S.
at 511) (internal citations omitted)).
219 See Johnson, 543 U.S. at 511.
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proper prison administration., 220 Elsewhere, her majority opinion indicated
that racial discrimination-in or out of prison--did not resemble other
constitutional injuries given its "pernicious" nature 221 and incompatibility
with "public respect for our system of justice. 222
B. COMMON SENSE AFTER JOHNSON
In mandating strict scrutiny of an express racial classification, the
Johnson Court dramatically altered the evidentiary burden. Whereas the
Ninth Circuit placed a "heavy burden" on inmates to rebut "common-
sense,"223 the Supreme Court made the parties change places. Under the
strict scrutiny test, prison officials must demonstrate that "temporary" racial
segregation promotes "a compelling state interest" and does so using a
"narrowly tailored" approach.224
But here is the rub: Gerald Gunther's much-quoted assertion that strict
scrutiny is "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact ' 225 just isn't so in penal
matters. Take the post-Johnson decision, Parker v. Kramer.226 "[C]lear[]
racial tensions" had gripped the prison yard of the California state prison at
Tuolumne.2 27 Prison staff had responded by closing the yard.228 Plaintiffs'
amended complaint stated in relevant part that a prison officer violated their
right to equal protection when he separately moved racially distinct groups
of black and white inmates to a fenced-in area after an alarm sounded
elsewhere in the prison.229 In approving the defendants' motion for
dismissal, the district court described the situation as an "immediate
potential threat of violence ' 230 that merited the brief racial segregation of
certain inmates.231 The court reasoned as follows:
Prison security is without question a compelling government interest and defendant's
actions were narrowly tailored to further that interest. [I]f defendant... separated the
inmates as plaintiff describes in his complaint, it was a necessary and temporary
220 Id. at 510.
221 Id. at 511 (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
222 Id.
223 Johnson v. California, 321 F.3d 791, 798, 801 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 543 U.S. 499
(2005).
224 Johnson, 543 U.S. at 515.
225 Gunther, supra note 19, at 8.
226 No. CVF-025117AWIDLBP, 2005 WL 2089802 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 29, 2005).
227 Id. at *6.
22 Id. at *3.
229 Id. at "5.




response to a potential threat of race related violence and therefore warranted even
under the strict scrutiny analysis required by Johnson v. California.
232
Moreover, most racial segregation in prison falls under the "de facto"
rubric. Even prior to the Court's decision in Johnson, few states employed
express racial classification systems. A mere four percent of wardens had
official policies forbidding racial integration in housing inmates.2" Only
forty percent of wardens monitored racial balance. 234  Of the sixty-five
percent having official housing policies, one-in-four explicitly aimed for
"racial balance,, 235-a term that typically denotes a proportionate number
of whites and people of color in a particular housing unit, which allows
ample opportunity for self-segregation. 6
Although ninety percent of the inmate population lives in shared
cells, 237 only thirty percent of multiple-occupancy cells are racially
integrated.238 For example, prior to his confinement in a reception center,
Garrison Johnson for some sixteen years always "selected" an African
American cellmate.239 The experience of Garrison Johnson is not atypical;
inmates often can "choose" cellmates under official or de facto "freedom-
of-choice" policies. 240 The outcome is stark but not surprising: there occurs
232 Id. (citations omitted).
233 Martha L. Henderson et al., Race, Rights, and Order in Prison: A National Survey of
the Wardens on Racial Integration of Prison Cells, 80 PRISON J. 295, 302 tbl.3 (2000).
234 Id. at 303 tbl.4.
235 Id. at 302 tbl.3.
236 Cf id. at 306-07:
In those institutions where policies do exist, whether written or not, a contradiction exists
between what wardens perceive to be the most desirable policy from the standpoint of safety and
security and what the wardens state they actually do in their prisons. More than half of the
wardens state that assigning inmates to housing on a race-neutral basis, monitoring the degree of
racial balance regularly, and changing inmates' assignments to promote balance is preferred.
These same wardens, however, do not monitor the racial composition of cells occupied by more
than one inmate (62% state they do not monitor). Many who do monitor are unlikely to make
changes in assignments to achieve greater balance. Moreover, those who do make changes do so
only some of the time or in rare circumstances.
237 See id. at 304-05.
23 See id. at 305 (finding that seventy percent of the inmates sharing a cell have a
cellmate of the same race).
239 Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 550 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
240 See, e.g., Brief for the Nat'l Ass'n of Black Law Enforcement Officers, Inc. as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 17-18, Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499
(2005) (No. 03-636), 2004 WL 1790882 (describing the "permanent policy" for housing
inmates after the end of the "reception" period); Craig Hemmens, No Shades of Grey: The
Legal Implications of Voluntary Racial Segregation in Prison, 4 CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q. 20,
24 (2000) (stating that "many facilities allow inmates to choose their cell partner").
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"almost total segregation of races" when inmates select their cellmates.24'
A likely culprit, common sense racism, can be easily located in anecdotal
accounts of prison life.242
Wardens appear to have little resolve to buck common sense racism
and forbid "freedom-of-choice" in selecting cellmates. Surely some prison
workers "acquiesce to inmate demands" for segregated housing.
243
Although the majority of wardens do not believe that racial integration
increases violence 244 and view "race-neutral" housing assignments as "the
most desirable from the standpoint of safety and security,, 245 what they
"actually do" is leave things as they are-unless judicially mandated to do
246otherwise. Moreover, one veteran commentator contends that when
wardens do "voluntarily" seek racial balance, their motivation has more to
do with avoiding the appearance of bias than pursuing racial justice.247
"Common sense" would suggest that prison officials' timidity in
confronting inmate self-segregation can be partly attributed to the same
pejorative "background ideas of race" that congeal as common sense
racism.
2 48
241 Hemmens, supra note 240, at 24.
242 See supra note 41 (citing various accounts of de facto segregation); see also, e.g.,
CARCERAL, supra note 35, at 137 (stating that "prisons still remain racial hate factories");
HASSINE ET AL., supra note 34, at 71 ("Everyone in the prison system was forced to play the
bias game. . . ."); SILBERMAN, supra note 154, at 195 (describing prison life as a "cauldron
of hate and violence"); cf John P. May, Introduction, in BUILDING VIOLENCE: HOw
AMERICA'S RUSH TO INCARCERATE CREATES MORE VIOLENCE xv, xvi (John P. May ed.,
2000) (describing prisons as "toxic environments").
243 Hemmens, supra note 240, at 21.
244 See Henderson et al., supra note 233, at 304 tbl.5 (indicating that thirty percent of the
wardens responded affirmatively to the following statement: "[The racial integration of
individual cells] is likely to increase the level of violence in an institution;" whereas 15.7%
responded that "[it is likely to decrease the level of violence in an institution;" and 54.3%
responded that "[i]t would not have an effect, one way or the other, on the level of violence
in an institution").
245 Id. (responding to what "would be most desirable," 60.3% indicated race-neutral
housing and would change existing housing to achieve it; 24.4% also viewed race-neutral
housing as most desirable but would do nothing to achieve racial balance; 13.7% would have
"racial balance in cell blocks but allow inmates to choose cells near others of their own race
and to not cell with somebody of another race"; and 1.5% would segregate inmates by race
into "separate cell blocks or wings").
246 Id. at 307; see also Carroll, supra note 26, at 377 (stating that "administrative
pressure [for racial balance] is eroded by inmate preferences for self-segregation").
247 See SILBERMAN, supra note 154, at 50 (stating that efforts at racial balance are
undertaken to avoid the appearance of bias).
248 See, e.g., ALAN ELSNER, GATES OF INJUSTICE: THE CRISIS IN AMERICAN'S PRISONS 53-
54 (2004) (delineating instances of racial bias by prison staff); WILLIAM L. SELKE, PRISONS
IN CRISIS 71 (1993) (stating that "racism has always been a part of prison regimes," and
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In Green v. County School Board,249 the Supreme Court addressed a
"freedom-of-choice" approach to reassigning students in a historically
segregated, dual system of public education. Not a single student crossed
the "color line., 250  Speaking for the Court, Justice Brennan invalidated
"freedom-of-choice" because it perpetuated a dual school system.
251
But commencing with its decision in Washington v. Davis,252 the Court
has required the showing of a racially discriminatory purpose when
addressing facially-neutral policies,253 and a racially disparate impact or the
anticipation of such impact does not satisfy this test.254 The Supreme Court
in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.
255
subsequently ruled that the discriminatory intent could be established by 1)
"a clear pattern" of discriminatory effects "unexplainable on grounds other
than race";2 56 2) "the historical background"; 257 3) "the specific sequence of
events leading up to the challenged decision"; 258 or 4) "the legislative or
administrative history."
259
Commentators have characterized the aggrieved party's burden as
"almost insurmountable, 260 requiring proof "that officials were 'out to get'
prison life reflects "daily living in the outside world"); SILBERMAN, supra note 154, at 196
(observing that the prison "reproduces the social structure of the larger society" and thus
"there is a long history of racial conflict" in prison).
249 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
250 Id. at 433.
251 Id. at 441-42.
252 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
253 See id. at 239 ("A purpose to discriminate must be present which may be proven by
systematic exclusion of eligible jurymen of the proscribed race or by unequal application of
the law to such an extent as to show intentional discrimination." (quoting Akins v. Texas,
325 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1945))); see also Tolbert v. McGrath, No. C 04-3039 SI(PR), 2005
WL 3310065, at *6 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 7, 2005) ("The inmate making an equal protection claim
must demonstrate discriminatory intent or purpose by the defendants.").
254 See Pers. Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (ruling that "'[d]iscriminatory
purpose' . . . . implies that the decisionmaker... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of
action at least in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group") (footnote and citations omitted); see also Hernandez v. New York, 500
U.S. 352, 362 (1991) (declaring that "the impact of a classification does not alone show its
purpose").
255 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
256 Id. at 266.
257 Id. at 267.
258 Id.
259 Id. at 268.
260 Damon J. Keith, What Happens to a Dream Deferred: An Assessment of Civil Rights
Law Twenty Years After the 1963 March on Washington, 19 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 469,
476 (1984). The Supreme Court agreed that the test demanded a great deal. See, e.g.,
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a person or group on account of race."'26 ' For instance, in the post-Johnson
case McClain v. Rogers,262  the court refused to cast as racially
discriminatory a ban on religious practices advocating white supremacy.263
Instead, the court characterized the defendants' actions as "premised on the
need to maintain prison security, ... [which] under Turner would be
deemed a neutral basis for classification. ' '264 Similarly, the Pennsylvania
Commonwealth Court concluded that regulating "Afro" hairstyles was
"neutral as to race" because members of "any race" could sport them.265
In "fail[ing] as a comprehensive account of discrimination, '266 the
discriminatory intent test "tames" Johnson as a counterpose to common
sense racism. Resting on "a widely-shared, taken-for-granted set of ideas
[about race] within a culture, 267 common sense racism does not typically
manifest itself as purposive. Because of the transparency phenomenon,
white prison workers do not think of their actions as "race-specific. 268
Thornburgh v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44 (1986) (characterizing the discriminatory intent test
as "inordinately difficult" to satisfy) (internal quotations omitted).
261 Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1388, 1405 (1988). See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S.
625, 631-32 (1972) ("Once a prima facie case of invidious discrimination is established, the
burden of proof shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of unconstitutional action by
showing that permissible racially neutral selection criteria and procedures have produced the
monochromatic result.").
262 155 F. App'x. 918 (7th Cir. 2005).
263 Id. at 920.
264 Id.
265 Meggett v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 892 A.2d 872, 887-88 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006). But cf
Flournoy v. Schomig, 152 F. App'x. 535, 538 (7th Cir. 2005) (ruling that denying a black
inmate "privileges" accorded whites gave rise to the presumption of racial discrimination).
266 Strauss, supra note 17, at 937-38. As Strauss wrote, the discriminatory intent
requirement ended "the possibility that Brown would stand for a principle that mandated
relatively far-reaching changes in society." Id. at 954. See also Marguerite A. Driessen,
Toward a More Realistic Standard for Proving Discriminatory Intent, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV.
RTS. L. REv. 19, 20 (2002) (asserting the "current impotence" of equal protection doctrine);
cf Bennett, supra note 104, at 1011 (concluding that "a conscious subjective motivation
requirement does not capture any apparent ideal of equal protection").
267 HANEY L6PEZ, supra note 71, at 128.
268 Flagg, supra note 119, at 976. Lawrence's observation below is applicable to
common sense racism:
Traditional notions of intent do not reflect the fact that decisions about racial matters are
influenced in large part by factors that can be characterized as neither intentional-in the sense
that certain outcomes are self-consciously sought-nor unintentional-in the sense that the
outcomes are random, fortuitous, and uninfluenced by the decisionmaker's beliefs, desires, and
wishes.
Lawrence, supra note 133, at 322; cf Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal
Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 747, 752
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Similarly, Ian Haney L6pez describes common sense racism as containing
"racial ideas" that "remain in the background '2 69 and thus beyond the reach
of the discriminatory intent test.
Unless the Court modifies the discriminatory intent test, common
sense racism as practiced by inmates and prison staff will continue to paint
a subtle yet, for inmates, easily demarcated color line in multiple-occupancy
cells. Although this color line may not carry the same "badge of
inferiority" worn by the black school children of Topeka, Kansas,27°
segregation in prison reinforces pejorative racial stereotypes-one being,
"black prisoners are inherently too violent to be housed with white
prisoners, ... [which] is but a contemporary version on the theme of blacks
as savages.,
271
After Johnson, which test applies when aggrieved inmates cannot
attribute disparate treatment to express racial classifications or
discriminatory intent? Justice O'Connor's majority opinion implies that
Turner's lax reasonableness standard constitutes the default test.
272
Subsequent case law agrees.273 The district court in Tolbert v. McGrath
274
explained as follows:
(2001) (observing that a "common complaint" of many commentators "is that current legal
doctrines are inadequate to handle contemporary manifestations of bias against...
disfavored social groups"); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1995) (stating that "courts have so far failed to develop doctrinal
models capable of addressing.., subtle or unconscious race and national origin
discrimination").
269 HANEY LOPEZ, supra note 71, at 119.
270 One of the leading penal commentators, James Jacobs, wrote in 1982:
The situation in today's prisons is different [than the Jim Crow era]. Blacks are frequently the
majority, not the minority, and administrative methods for controlling race conflict do not
bespeak contempt for either blacks or whites. While the insult to blacks intended by the South's
racist system was clear to anyone, black or white, the meaning of certain racially conscious
administrative practices in today's prisons is hardly to be understood in the same way.
JACOBS, supra note 25, at 87.
271 Samuel Walker, The Limits of Segregation in Prisons: A Reply to Jacobs, 21 CRIM. L.
BULL. 485, 491 (1985); see also Risdon N. Slate et al., Racial Segregation as a Correctional
Management Tool: Beyond Lee v. Washington, 3 CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q. 66, 74 (1999)
(asserting that segregation by race among prisoners strengthens negative stereotypes).
272 See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 509-11 (2005) (delineating the reach of
Turner). Should Turner not apply, little would change because the Court in Washington v.
Davis applied rational basis review when a discriminatory purpose cannot be shown. See
426 U.S. 229, 250-52 (1976).
273 See, e.g., McClain v. Rogers, 155 F. App'x. 918, 920 (7th Cir. 2005) (characterizing
the plaintiffs claim as one based on religious discrimination rather than race); Meggett v.
Pa. Dep't of Corr., 892 A.2d 872, 887-88 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (applying the Turner test
to a prison regulation about "Afro" haircuts, which the court deemed to be race-neutral). But
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For distinctions drawn among prisoners other than those based on race, strict scrutiny
is inappropriate to test the infringement of prisoners' constitutional rights. Where a
prison regulation (other than a race-based one) impinges on inmates' constitutional
rights, the regulation or practice is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests.
2 7 5
Moreover, some courts, including the highly-regarded District of
Columbia Circuit, have employed "factless," common sense scrutiny in
addressing the central component of the Turner standard-whether "[t]he
logical connection between the regulation and the asserted goal is so remote
as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational. 276 To follow their lead is to
risk dancing with common sense racism when adjudicating uses of stigma-
rich, racialized prison space.
IV. HOMER PLESSY AND GARRISON JOHNSON: EQUAL PROTECTION AND
EQUAL CONCERN
Unlike Garrison Johnson, Homer Plessy expressly sought empathy
from each Supreme Court Justice: "[If judges were African American and
lived under Jim Crow,] [w]hat humiliation, what rage would... fill the
judicial mind ... ?,277 The Plessy Court chose not to respond; according
Homer Plessy empathy would have given him a social standing
incompatible with the common sense of the period. 278 Not even Justice
cf Glisson v. Sangamon County Sheriffs Dep't, 408 F. Supp. 2d 609, 625 (C.D. II1. 2006)
(citing Johnson for the proposition that "if an individual is a member of a protected class,
any policy that discriminates against him or her must be reviewed under the strict scrutiny
test").
274 No. C 04-3039 SI, 2005 WL 3310065, at *6 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 7,2005).
275 See id. ("In short, a race discrimination claim is analyzed under a strict scrutiny
standard and a religious discrimination claim analyzed under the less restrictive Turner
standard") (citations omitted).
276 Kimberlin v. Dep't of Justice, 318 F.3d 228, 233 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987)); see also, e.g., Frost v. Symington, 197 F.3d 348, 357
(9th Cir. 1999) (stating that the government must show a "common-sense" connection
between challenged prison regulations and penal objectives per the first-prong of the Turner
standard); Ametal v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("In that case, the [Turner]
Court scoured the record for evidence of a rational link between the asserted security
interests and the marriage ban because common sense does not suggest any.").
277 Brief for the Plaintiff In Error at *36, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (No.
210), 1893 WL 10660.
278 See, e.g., Robert Moats Miller, The Attitudes of American Protestantism Toward the
Negro, 1919-1939, in THE NEGRO IN DEPRESSION AND WAR 105, 106 (Bernard Sternsher ed.,
1969) ("A New England Minister suggested to his congregation that they invite the members
of a neighboring Negro church to a church, whereupon the ladies of the flock served notice
that they would not attend .... ).
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Harlan's storied dissent demonstrates acceptance of Homer Plessy as the
social equal of white people.279
In Brown, Earl Warren honored Homer Plessy's empathic request. In
Brown, he speaks of feeling, of human pain, and of moral evil. The
recognition of human experience and pain-of feeling-is obvious: "To
separate [school children] from others of a similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates feeling of inferiority as to their status
in the community and may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone."
280
What led Warren to rise above the common sense of the era and strike
down Jim Crow? The pragmatic former prosecutor and governor would not
have been out-of-character had he appealed in Brown to common sense-as
advocates of Jim Crow would likely have urged. President Eisenhower had
after all nominated then-Governor Warren because he "seemed to reflect
high ideals and a great deal of common sense."
281
I would like to think that Warren's former black driver played no small
part in the Chief Justice's capacity to rise above common sense racism. He
apparently told the Chief Justice of the indignities suffered at the hands of
Jim Crow. 282 Perhaps Warren then recognized that empathy shares little
with common sense. Behind the qualities Clifford Geertz attributed to
common sense-"[n]aturalness, practicalness, thinness,
immethodologicalness, and accessibleness" 283-resides their byproduct,
stereotyping. By contrast, empathy counters stereotypes because it requires
that we put ourselves in the shoes of the "other." Achieving this objective,
observed Lynne Henderson, involves several dimensions-"historical,
experiential, emotional, and cognitive," which makes the inmate of color
more intelligible.284 Empathy can also flush out "background ideas of
279 Cf Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 561 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that
"social equality no more exists between the races when traveling in a passenger coach...
than when members of the same race ... stand or sit with each other in a political
assembly").
280 Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Sympathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574, 1594 (1987)
(quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954)) (footnote omitted).
281 KLUGER, supra note 5, at 663.
282 See KENNETH KARTS, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONSTITUTION 18-19 (1989) (recounting Warren's conversation).
283 GEERTZ, supra note 18, at 85 (internal quotation marks omitted).
284 Henderson, supra note 280, at 1581 (footnote omitted). Empathy, observed Lynne
Henderson, is not incompatible with knowledge or reason:
[E]mpathy is a form of understanding, a phenomenon that encompasses affect as well as
cognition in determining meanings; it is a rich source of knowledge and approaches to legal
problems-which are, ultimately, human problems. Properly understood, empathy is not a
"weird" or "mystical" phenomenon, nor is it "intuition." Rather, it is a way of knowing that can
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race." 285 A white jurist can thus disrupt the transparency phenomenon by
making otherwise invisible race norms visible, which in turn illuminates the
privileges of whiteness.
explode received knowledge of legal problems and structures that reveals moral problems
previously sublimated by pretensions to reductionist rationality ....
Id. at 1576 (footnote omitted); see also Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim
Impact Statements, 63 U. Cmf. L. REv. 361, 380 (1996) (describing empathy as a value-free
capacity); Michael J. Swygert & Katherine Earle Yanes, A Unified Theory of Justice: The
Integration of Fairness Into Efficiency, 73 WASH. L. REv. 249, 308 (1998) ("[E]mpathy can
be conceptualized not as an emotion, but as a rational mental capacity for understanding
another person's situation.") (footnote omitted); Benjamin Zipurksy, DeShaney and the
Jurisprudence of Compassion, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1101, 1135 (1998) (describing empathy as
"the power to understand the social environment").
285 Teresa Bruce, The Empathy Principle, 6 L. & SEXUALITY 109, 112 (1996):
In order for jurists to use empathy to guide their interpretation... they must both understand and
identify with a given litigant's position. They must appreciate the external factors influencing
her behavior, such as her race and class, and they must additionally appreciate the more subtle,
internal factors, such as her emotions, feelings, desires, and needs. Empathy, in short, requires a
people-centered approach. It requires a jurist to cast aside her provincialism and to stand in
someone else's shoes.
See also Rachel D. Godsil, Expressivism, Empathy and Equality, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
247, 286 (2003) ("Only a standard expressly requiring the judge to engage in empathy may
help to overcome unconscious racism, particularly when unconscious racism stands as a
roadblock to that empathy.").
By no means do I assert that empathy will bring common sense racism to a halt. As
O'Grady observed:
Empathy in judging is not predictive of outcome-it is part of a process, but it does not carry the
day .... [B]ut... the incorporation of empathy in judicial decisionmaking will provide a judge
with new understandings and enhanced knowledge of context with which to access a case.
Catherine Gage O'Grady, Empathy and Perspective in Judging: The Honorable William C.
Canby, Jr., 33 ARIz. ST. L.J. 4, 10-11 (2001) (footnotes omitted); but see Kenji Yoshino,
Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96 COLUM. L.
REv. 1753, 1765 (1996) ("And there's the rub: how can a judge see a blindness she
shares?").
Empathy may well be a universal capacity of the human species. Arguably it aids in the
survival of the species by virtue of its capacity to build socially interdependent communities.
Empathetic individuals are more likely to aid others in distress as well as build communal
bonds. Individuals within these communities possess survival advantages over those lacking
access to mutual-aid networks. See, e.g., Richard Delgato, Rodrigo's Eleventh Chronicle:
Empathy and False Empathy, 84 CAL. L. REv. 61, 79 (1996) (identifying "bonding" as the
main function of empathy). Culture, however, can diminish or enhance one's capacity for
empathy. Here lies the stain of racism on the civil culture of the United States. Because of
the legacy of slavery and Jim Crow, whites are inclined to confuse social habits with
underlying human traits. Withholding active empathy likely originated in the social
construction of whiteness, withstood Brown, and continues to afflict whites in the North and
South.
Justice Clarence Thomas' dissent in Johnson invites speculation that he withheld active
empathy from inmate Garrison Johnson. His embrace of "due deference" is so complete-
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Chief Justice Warren, unlike the Plessy Court, may have also
understood that equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment
obligates judges to reach across the social conventions about race relations
28
and exercise "equal" empathy for African Americans. 86 No doubt he
would have been familiar with Carolene Product's footnote four287 and its
grant of "special solicitude"-an empathetic phrase in itself-for "discrete
and insular groups, 288 which the Court would later characterize as
"suspect" classes. 2 89 These groups cannot rely on the majoritarian branches
for protection because of "empathy failure-the group's inability to make
its claims sympathetic to potential bargaining partners. 2 90  Consequently,
they cannot overcome what John Hart Ely characterized as the
"cooperation-blocking prejudice.29
he insisted that "the Constitution's demands" must be "accommodat[ed] ... to those of the
prison administration"-that it leaves no role for empathy. Johnson v. California, 543 U.S.
499, 531 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also Eric L. Muller, Where, but for the Grace
of God, Goes He? The Search for Empathy in the Criminal Jurisprudence of Clarence
Thomas, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 225, 227-30 (1998) (arguing that Justice Thomas' capacity
for empathy is "[u]ndeveloped" in that he can only empathize with people who share "his
fate" rather than that of the "outsider"); cf Michael DeHaven Newsom, Clarence Thomas,
Victim? Perhaps, and Victimizer? Yes-A Study in Social and Racial Alienation From
African-Americans, 48 ST. Louis U. L.J. 327, 328 (2004) (arguing that "Clarence Thomas is
deeply alienated from most African-Americans, and his alienation largely operates to
repudiate, disavow, and otherwise insult African-Americans").
286 See Deborah L. Brake, When Equality Leaves Everyone Worse Off: The Problem of
Leveling Down in Equality Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 513, 563 (1998) (contending that
the Equal Protection Clause is more than equal treatment, it is about equal concern, which
"should include an obligation to act with equal empathy for our shared humanity").
287 United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938); see also supra
note 106 (discussing the historical importance of footnote four).
288 Carolene Prods, 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4.
289 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (defining a
suspect class as "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful
unequal treatment, or relegated to a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process"). But see Robert C. Farrell,
Legislative Purpose and Equal Protection's Rationality Review, 37 VILL. L. REv. 1, 56
(1992) (stating that "the Supreme Court has never explained how to decide which form of
review is appropriate in a particular case"); Douglas R. Widin, Note, Suspect Classifications:
A Suspect Analysis, 87 DICK. L. REv. 407, 427-28 (1982) (contending that "[t]he first
striking deficiency of suspect classifications analysis is the lack of cogent definition of
'suspect class"') (footnote omitted).
290 Yoshino, supra note 285, at 1764-65.
291 See Ely, supra note 104, at 160. In many respects, inmates at large constitute a
"discrete" group lacking empathy. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, COURTS, POLITICS, AND
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 288 (1993) ("Incarcerated criminal offenders constitute a despised
minority without political power to influence the policies of legislative and executive
officials."); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32 SUFFOLK
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While Warren exemplifies empathic rectitude, he did not articulate an
operational role for empathy in the multi-tiered model of equal protection
that emerged from his tenure as Chief Justice. Several have been
advanced.292 Jerry Kang's can be recommended for its clarity and
economy.293 He proposes examining the challenged government practice
from "multiple perspectives," which initially requires that "the judge must
place himself figuratively in the perspective of each party to the litigation
and interpret the social meaning of the practice from that perspective. 294
Subsequently, "the judge must use the empathic insights generated at the
first step to scrutinize the various social meanings and test them for blind
spots, insensitivities, and oversensitivities. ' '295 The next step involves
"weighing the competing perspective" to determine if it "convey[s] a
message of stigma., 296  Lastly, if the government practice conveys "a
strongly stigmatic message," the judge employs "strict scrutiny" to
U. L. REv. 441, 449-60 (1999) ("Those in the military, in prisons, and in schools are classic
examples of discrete and insular minorities, who have little political power."); Julie M.
Riewe, Note, The Least Among Us: Unconstitutional Changes In Prisoner Litigation Under
the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 47 DUKE L.J. 117, 143 (1997) ("While not a
suspect class as traditionally defined, prisoners nonetheless comprise a politically vulnerable
and underrepresented group that must rely on the courts for protection .... "). Federal courts
have uniformly and repeatedly rejected prisoners' bid for protection as a suspect group. See,
e.g., Zehner v. Trigg, 133 F.3d 459, 463 (7th Cir. 1997) (finding that "the idea [that inmates
constitute a suspect class] is completely unsupported"); Wilson v. Giesen, 956 F.2d 738, 744
(7th Cir. 1992) ("But prisoners are not a suspect class."); Pryor v. Brennan, 914 F.2d 921,
923 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Prisoners do not constitute a suspect class."); Moss v. Clark, 886 F.2d
686, 690 (4th Cir. 1989) ("Prisoners are not a suspect class.").
292 See, e.g., ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 79-87 (1997) (arguing for an empathic
approach to judging); Godsil, supra note 285, at 286 (arguing that "empathy may help
[judges] to overcome unconscious racism"); Henderson, supra note 280, at 1575 (arguing
that "[t]he avoidance of emotion, affect, and experiential understanding reflects an
impoverished view of reason and understanding---one that focuses on cognition in its most
reductionist sense"); Jerry Kang, Negative Action Against Asian Americans: The Internal
Instability of Dworkin's Defense of Affirmative Action, 31 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 27
(1996) (contending that "the judge must use the empathic insights.., to scrutinize the
various social meanings and test them for blindspots, insensitivities, and oversensitivities").
But see, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 412 (1990) (contending
the empathic judging would render judicial decisionmaking unpredictable); Cynthia V.
Ward, A Kinder, Gentler Liberalism? Visions of Empathy in Feminist and Communitarian
Literature, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 929 (finding empathic judging untenable). I agree with Susan
Bandes's contention that excluding empathy for "outsider" groups, such as blacks and
inmates of all races, buttresses dominant narratives. See Bandes, supra note 284, at 364-65
(responding to Posner's criticism of reliance on empathy in judging).
293 Kang, supra note 292.





determine if the practice promotes a compelling state interest in the manner
least restrictive of the disadvantaged party's constitutional interests.297 But
if the challenged government practice conveys a "mildly stigmatic
message," the court employs intermediate scrutiny and thereby inquires
whether the practice is substantially related to an important government
interest. 298 One employs the rational basis test in the absence of a stigma
message.299
Building on Professor Kang's empathy-based test, while remaining
mindful of the several ways of satisfying the Court's discriminatory intent
test, I propose a hybrid of the two. My aim is to create from racially
identified space a "middle ground" for judges who recognize the pernicious
impact of common sense racism but are unwilling to abandon the
discriminatory intent test. Because equal protection embraces equal
empathy, prison workers' expected competencies should include empathy
and the insights it provides. The proposed test presumes that prison
officials exercise empathy for inmates of color and thus overcome the
transparency phenomenon, which obscures common sense racism from
their consciousness. Given the stigma-rich environment created by
racialized space, with the prison being among the premier "acreage," any
housing scheme other than one of forced integration would lead to the
presumption that prison staff acted with discriminatory purpose. The
burden would then shift to the prison staff to demonstrate lack of intent.
Sadly, my proposed test or the unlikely repudiation of the
discriminatory intent test will not result in substantial integration of prison
cells. There are simply not enough white, non-Hispanic male prisoners,
who now comprise a minority of inmates. At the close of 2004, white
inmates comprised thirty-four percent of all federal and state male prisoners
serving sentences of longer than one year.300
V. CONCLUSION
A. TRADING PLACES
If a namesake of Homer Plessy could trade places with inmate
Garrison Johnson what would he say to us? Like the Homer Plessy, he
might ask the Justices to put themselves in his shoes. If the Justices
297 Id. at 30.
298 Id.
299 Id.
300 HARRISON & BECK, supra note 155, at 8. African Americans accounted for forty-one
percent of the prisoners while Hispanics comprised nineteen percent. See id.
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honored his request, they would vicariously experience the dominant
expression of common sense racism-the seeming indifference of the white
population to the mass incarceration of undereducated young black men.30 1
A hypothetical namesake of Homer Plessy could be among the large
segment of young, inner city African American men relocated to one of the
many prisons that perpetuate the "separate but equal" precept of Plessy v.
Ferguson. This prison functions as a "peculiar institution" by excluding
large numbers of black offenders from the mainstream economic, political,
and social life of the nation. Loic Wacquant labels inmate Homer Plessy's
institutional residence a "judicial ghetto":
[T]he ghetto is a manner of "social prison" while the prison functions as a "judicial
ghetto." Both are entrusted with enclosing a stigmatized population so as to neutralize
the material and/or symbolic threat that it poses for the broader society from which it
has been extruded.
°3 0
Wacquant finds a "deep kinship" between ghettoes and prisons in that
they share the same elements: (1) a stigmatized population that (2) is
constrained or coerced, and (3) experiences territorial confinement, wherein
the inhabitants develop "distinctive institutions, culture, and a sullied
identity. 30 3  Moreover, ghettoes and prisons share much of the same
301 Some commentators attributed the racial disparity in the prison to an inability to
empathize with the plight of a race other than your own. While the following observations
address the war on drugs, one of the major reasons for the disparity in rates of imprisonment
of blacks and whites, they are emblematic of a lack of empathy for African Americans in
general and especially young black men. See David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal
Protection, 47 STAN. L. REv. 1283, 1308 (1995) (footnotes omitted):
The federal crack penalties provide a paradigmatic case of unconscious racism. While these
penalties may reflect some degree of affirmative antipathy toward blacks, the evidence of that is
at best suggestive and anecdotal. What the legislative history of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act and its
predecessors provide a good deal more reason to suspect is that, regardless of the objectives
Congress was pursuing, it would have shown more restraint in fashioning the crack penalties, or
more interest in amending them in ensuing years, if the penalties did not apply almost
exclusively to blacks. In the words of one defense attorney, "Maybe I'm cynical, but I think that
if you saw a lot of young white males getting five-and-10-year minimums for dealing powder
cocaine, you'd have a lot more reaction."
See Bruce Western et al., The Labor Market: Consequences of Incarceration, 47 CRIME &
DELINQ. 410, 414 (2001) ("[A] clear majority of Black high school dropouts are likely to
have been to prison at some time."); see also Anthony Gillmer, Note, United States v. Clary:
Equal Protection and the Crack Statute, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 497, 501-03 (1995) (asserting
that the federal crack statute represents unconscious racism); cf MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN
NEGLECT 123 (1964) ("It is hard to imagine any legitimate rationale for the decision by the
drug war's designers to adopt policies that were unlikely to achieve their ostensible goals
and that were foreordained to affect disadvantaged black Americans disproportionately.").
302 Loic Wacquant, The New 'Peculiar Institution': On the Prison as Surrogate Ghetto,
4 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 377, 378 (2000).
303 Id. at 382-83.
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demography and thus possess a symbiotic relationship. Certain inner city
neighborhoods are home to a disproportionate share of the prison
population. For instance, twenty percent of the inmates sentenced in Ohio's
Cuyahoga County came from three percent of the county's census block
groups as of July 1, 2001.304 A 2001 report of Maryland's prison
population revealed a comparable portrait, with fifty-six percent of those
released from its state's prisons having previously resided in fifteen percent
of the Baltimore area's neighborhoods.3 °5
For undereducated, youthful black males, imprisonment represents a
"common life event" and thus functions as one of several, well-ordered
304 James P. Lynch & William J. Sabol, Prisoner Reentry in Perspective, 3 CRIME POL'Y
REPT., Sept. 2001, at 1, 16, available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/410213-
reentry.PDF.
305 JEREMY TRAvIS ET AL., URBAN INST., JUSTICE POLICY CTR., PRISON TO HOME: THE




stages in their "life course. 306  It shapes their trajectory in life via
stigmatization; 30 7 socio-economic marginalization; 30 8 and civil disabilities
such as disenfranchisement °3 0 9 denial of public housing, 310 and exclusion
306 Becky Pettit & Bruce Western, Mass Imprisonment and the Life Course: Race and
Class Inequality in U.S. Incarceration, 69 AM. Soc. REv. 151, 154 (2004); see also Austin,
supra note 148, at *2 tbl.2:
Table 1
Life Chances of Being Imprisoned in the United States (1974-2001).
1974 1991 2001
Total 1.9% 5.2% 6.6%
Males
White 3.6% 9.1% 11.3%
Black 13.4% 29.4% 32.2%
Hispanic 4.0% 16.3% 17.2%
Females
Total 0.3% 1.1% 1.8%
White 0.2% 0.5% 0.9%
Black 1.1% 3.6% 5.6%
Hispanic 0.4% 1.5% 2.2%
307 See, e.g., John Hagan & Ronit Dinovitzer, Collateral Consequences of Imprisonment
for Children, Communities, and Prisoners, in PRISONS 121, 126-28 (Michael Tonry & Joan
Petersilia eds., 1999) (observing "the stigma of imprisonment"); Marc Mauer, Thinking
About Prison and Its Impact on the Twenty-First Century, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 607, 609
(2005) (writing of "the stigma of imprisonment").
308 See, e.g., Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration and Racial Inequality in
Men's Employment, 54 INDus. & LAB. REL. REv. 3, 12-13 (2000) ("We have found that
employment patterns cannot be understood without reference to the growth of
incarceration .... It seems likely that status attainment, school-to-work transitions, and
family structure all are influenced, perhaps even routinely, by the penal system in the current
period of high incarceration.").
309 See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment: Reflections on the
Racial Uses ofInfamia, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1895, 1898-1900 (1999) (noting that only four
states do not disenfranchise felons and that fourteen percent of black men are
disenfranchised); cf Aman McLeod et al., The Locked Ballot Box: The Impact of State
Criminal Disenfranchisement Laws on African American Voting Behavior and Implications
for Reform, 11 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 66, 93 (2003) (concluding that disenfranchisement
statutes disproportionably suppress voting by non-disenfranchised blacks).
310 See, e.g., Nora V. Demleitner, Collateral Damage: No Re-entry for Drug Offenders,
47 VILL. L. REv. 1027, 1036 (2002) (stating that "[f]ederal housing policies allow for the
exclusion of drug offenders from federally subsidized or funded housing") (footnote
omitted); Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-Offender Reentry,
45 B.C. L. REv. 255, 278 (2004) ("In 1988... Congress... through an amendment to the
public housing statute adopt[ed] [a] one-strike eviction policy from federal public housing.
The intent of the amendment was to prohibit admission to applicants and to evict or
terminate leases of residents who engaged in certain types of criminal activity.").
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from certain professions.31' Moreover, the harm extends to the "other
prisoners"--family members and loved ones; several studies suggest that
the absence of large numbers of young black men adversely impacts
marriage formation,312 child-rearing,1 3 and participation in communities.314
B. A CLOSING LAMENT
I doubt that Homer Plessy would be charitable in his assessment of the
prevailing common sense of his era. He surely did not invoke common
sense in his challenge to Jim Crow laws. 315 By then the prevailing common
sense contained race-based presuppositions that buttressed the Jim Crow
laws.3 16 Plessy's imprisoned namesake could add that pejorative maxims
311 See, e.g., Leroy D. Clark, A Civil Rights Task, Removing Barriers to Employment of
Ex-Convicts, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 193, 195 (2004) ("The laws of every state, some federal
statutes, and innumerable municipal ordinances expressly include a felony conviction as a
disqualifying factor with regard to the majority of regulated occupation.") (footnotes
omitted); Margaret E. Finzen, Systems of Incarceration: The Collateral Consequences of
Oppression and their Effects on Black Communities, 12 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 299,
307-08 (2005) (documenting that "various occupational and licensing restrictions throughout
the states further restrict a convicted felon's opportunity to obtain employment").
312 See Donald Braman, Families and Incarceration, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS INCARCERATION 117, 126-27 (Marc Mauer & Meda
Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (observing that "marriage and coparenting are far less common
and single female-headed households are far more common in areas where incarceration
rates are high").
313 See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African
American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1284 (2004) ("Mass incarceration deprives
thousands of children of important economic and social support from their fathers.
Separation from imprisoned parents has serious psychological consequences for children,
including depression, anxiety, feelings of rejection, shame, anger, and guilt, and problems in
school.") (footnotes omitted).
314 See James P. Lynch et al., Crime, Coercion, and Community: The Effects of Arrest
and Incarceration Policies on Informal Social Control in Neighborhoods, Executive
Summary 14 (2002), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/grants/195172.pdf
("Increases in arrest or incarceration are associated with lower levels of participation in
voluntary organization and lower levels of attachment to communities. This type of
participation in communities is viewed as essential for maintaining organized and viable
communities.").
315 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Brief for the Plaintiff in Error, supra
note 285.
316 See Siegel, supra note 70, at 1129 (stating that the Plessy "decision conformed with
'common sense' intuitions about the meaning of equality"). Grace Elizabeth Hale writes that
"[b]y the early twentieth century, whites were constructing modem racial identity" on a
"mass cultural" level. HALE, supra note 41, at 8. She further observes that segregation
created a "new a cultural foundation for the very 'natural' race differences white southerners
had hoped to create." Id. at 9.
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about race can be heard ad nauseam in contemporary prisons.317 Moreover,
in his experience, prisoners often appeal to common sense in justifying the
de facto color line that racial groups enforce and prison staff tolerate.
318
After Johnson v. California, as before, race matters most.3 19
317 The author, who is the "voice" of Plessy's imprisoned namesake, has studied, visited,
and written about prisons for some thirty years. See Jonathan Simon, The "Society of
Captives " in the Era of Hyper-Incarceration, 4 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 285, 286 (2000)
(describing James Robertson as a "veteran [] observer of imprisonment").
3. See id. (highlighting the author's familiarity with prison life).
319 See supra notes 34-47 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of race on
contemporary prison life); cf HASSINE ET AL., supra note 34, at 71 (observing that "skin
color" constitutes the only basis for group identity among prisoners). But see Miriam
Jordan, California Prisons Uneasily Prepare to Desegregate Prisons, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21,
2006, at B1, available at http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SBI14290971697503763-
cBc66XQDvY3oGhmny49FBuPHc_20070321 .html?mod-tffmaintff top:
California is creating a desegregation program using Texas as a model. It involves educating
prison officers and prisoners and a screening process to weed out inmates whose criminal record
or prison history would make them a bad risk for a multiracial cell. One California facility is
testing a behavior-modification program that would deny privileges to inmates who undermine
the program.
At least some prisoners are prepared to give co-existing a try. "California has let inmates dictate
how they should live" for too long, says Franklin Porter, a 45-year-old black inmate. "If they're
integrating in other states, it can work here."
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